??xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>99久久777色,无码人妻久久一区二区三区蜜桃,蜜臀久久99精品久久久久久小说http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/category/1643.htmlTechnology changes the world, serves the people.zh-cnWed, 04 Aug 2010 01:58:04 GMTWed, 04 Aug 2010 01:58:04 GMT60Researcher Demonstrates ATM ‘Jackpotting?at Black Hat Conferencehttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/121725.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Fri, 30 Jul 2010 13:18:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/121725.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/121725.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/121725.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/121725.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/121725.html

Researcher Demonstrates ATM ‘Jackpotting’ at Black Hat Conference

LAS VEGAS ?In a city filled with slot machines spilling jackpots, it was a “jackpotted” ATM that got the most attention Wednesday at the Black Hat security conference, when researcher Barnaby Jack demonstrated two suave hacks against automated teller machines that made them spew out dozens of crisp bills.

The audience greeted the demonstration with hoots and applause.

In one of the attacks, Jack reprogrammed the ATM remotely over a network, without touching the machine; the second attack required he open the front panel and plug in a USB stick loaded with malware.

Jack, director of security research at IOActive Labs, focused his hack research on standalone and hole-in-the-wall ATMs ?the kind installed in retail outlets and restaurants. He did not rule out that bank ATMs could have similar vulnerabilities, but he hasn’t yet examined them.

The two systems he hacked onstage were made by Triton and Tranax. The Tranax hack was conducted using an authentication bypass vulnerability that Jack found in the system’s remote monitoring feature, which can be accessed over the internet or dial-up, depending on how the owner configured the machine.

Tranax’s remote monitoring system is turned on by default, but Jack said the company has since begun advising customers to protect themselves from the attack by disabling the remote system.

To conduct the remote hack, an attacker would need to know an ATM’s IP address or phone number. Jack said he believes about 95 percent of retail ATMs are on dial-up; a hacker could war dial for ATMs connected to telephone modems, and identify them by the cash machine’s proprietary protocol.

The Triton attack was made possible by a security flaw that allowed unauthorized programs to execute on the system. The company distributed a patch last November so that only digitally signed code can run on them.

Both the Triton and Tranax ATMs run on Windows CE.

Using a remote attack tool, dubbed Dillinger, Jack was able to exploit the authentication-bypass vulnerability in Tranax’s remote monitoring feature and upload software or overwrite the entire firmware on the system. With that capability, he installed a malicious program he wrote, called Scrooge.

Scrooge lurks on the ATM quietly in the background until someone wakes it up in person. It can be initiated in two ways ?either through a touch-sequence entered on the ATM’s keypad or by inserting a special control card. Both methods activate a hidden menu an attacker can use to make the machine spew out money or print receipts. Scrooge will also capture magstripe data embedded in bank cards other users insert into the ATM.

To demonstrate, Jack punched keys on the keypad to call up the menu, then instructed the machine to spit out 50 bills from one of four cassettes. The screen lit up with the word “Jackpot!” as the bills came flying out the front.

To hack the Triton, he used a key to open the machine’s front panel, then connected a USB stick containing his malware. The ATM uses a uniform lock on all of its systems ?the kind used on filing cabinets ?that can be opened with a $10 key available on the web. The same key opens every Triton ATM.

Two Triton representatives said at a press conference after the presentation that its customers preferred a single lock on systems so they could easily manage fleets of machines without requiring numerous keys. But they said Triton offers a lock upgrade kit to customers who request it ?the upgraded lock is a Medeco pick-resistant, high-security lock.

Similar malware attacks were discovered on bank ATMs in Eastern Europe last year. Security researchers at Trustwave, based in Chicago, found the malware on 20 machines in Russia and Ukraine that were all running Microsoft’s Windows XP operating system. They said they found signs that hackers were planning on bringing their attacks to machines in the United States. The malware was designed to attack ATMs made by Diebold and NCR.

Those attacks required an insider, such as an ATM technician or anyone else with a key to the machine, to place malware on the ATM. Once that was done, attackers could insert a control card into the machine’s card reader to trigger the malware and give them control of the machine through a custom interface and the ATM’s keypad.

The malware captured account numbers and PINs from the machine’s transaction application and then delivered it to the thief on a receipt printed from the machine in an encrypted format, or to a storage device inserted in the card reader. A thief could also instruct the machine to eject whatever cash was inside the machine. A fully loaded bank ATM can hold up to $600,000.

Earlier this year, in a separate incident, a Bank of America employee was charged with installing malware on his employer’s ATMs that allowed him to withdraw thousands of dollars without leaving a transaction record.

Jack was slated to give the same ATM vulnerability talk at Black Hat last year, but his then-employer Juniper Networks canceled the talk weeks before the conference after an unnamed ATM vendor expressed concern. He said on Wednesday that the earlier talk was withdrawn to allow Triton time to implement a patch to address the code-execution vulnerability targeted in his demonstration. The company released the patch eight months ago.

Jack said that so far he’s examined ATMs made by four manufacturers and all of them have vulnerabilities. “Every ATM I’ve looked at allows that ‘game over.’ I’m four for four,” he said at the press conference. He wouldn’t discuss the vulnerabilities in the two ATMs not attacked on Wednesday because he said his previous employer, Juniper Networks, owns that research.

Jack said his aim in demonstrating the hacks is to get people to look more closely at the security of systems that are presumed to be locked down and impenetrable.

Photo: Isaac Brekken/Associated Press



Read More http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/atms-jackpotted/#ixzz0vAgMMN79



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风雨兼程20载——记ATM入中国银行业20周年Q{载)http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/54682.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Thu, 26 Jun 2008 09:02:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/54682.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/54682.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/54682.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/54682.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/54682.html风雨兼程20载——记ATM入中国银行业20周年

http://www.fcmag.com.cn/Column/Special/28544.shtml

对于金融界来_ATM机算得上?0世纪最伟大的发明之一。对于中国的银行业而言QATM机开启了一扇通向用户的新H口。对于消费者而言QATM机已l成为日常生zȝ一部分。自1986q第一台ATM机在中国银行珠v分行投放至今QATM入中国银行业已有20q时间。随着中国银行业信息化的深入开展,Z对ATMZl历了一个由陌生到熟(zhn)的q程。如今,金融自助讑֤已成为银行开展个Z务的一条不可替代的渠道?br>     1996q_中国银行上v市分行在Ҏ(gu)开发区开办了国内W一家自助银行,为客h供全天候服务,逐步培养Z使用自助讑֤的习惯?br>     1998q后Q随着ATM机等自助讑֤在银行应用的逐渐成熟Q开始出C更多的自助银行。ATM动柜员机、CDM自动存款机、存折补L、触摸式多媒体电(sh)脑等讑֤的出玎ͼ使自助银行更接近于真正意义上的银行功能?br>     而h(hun)格昂贵,功能单一Q加上各银行发卡量不多,ATMZ为银行ؓ客户提供的一U便L“信息化服务手D?#8221;q谁家都用得v。截?000q底Q拥有ATM机数量占有绝对优势的工商银行Q投入用的ATMH破1万台Q此Ӟ牡丹卡发行量?000万张Q初步Ş成了覆盖全国的ATM助银行体pR其他银行则相差较远?br>    l过??q的h阶段Q各商业银行市场意识增强Q逐步意识到自助设备在未来个h金融业务发展中的重要性。于是ATM机在中国银行业进入了快速发展期?003q一?#8220;非典”H袭中国Q严重干CZ的日常生zd工作。而这l了|上银行、ATM机等金融渠道彰显其优势的Z。工行、中行、徏行等商业银行看到了市场在变化Q证券市场、资本市场正在迅速发展,个h客户理胦的需求不断增加,应q种市场的变化,UL开始重视零售业务的发展。其中,工商银行最早在国内实施了大客户战略即零售业务发展战略,推进了个人金融业务的转型。与此战略同步发展的是各商业银行寚w融自助设备的大力投入?br>    随着大量ATM机投攑ָ场,各行对ATM机的监控理工作也提上日E。工行通过实施ATM机前|机Ҏ(gu)Q直观地反映全行每台ATM机的q行情况Q以保用户使用ATMZ易的安全?005q_工商银行重点加大了对ATM机功能和服务的改q力度,通过U学调整ATM机的布局、加强ATM机的安全防范措施{,使ATM机的使用效率大大提高?005q工商银行ATMZ易总金额突?000亿元。ATMZ易量?6.2亿笔Q其中结类交易?.34亿笔Q同比增?.08亿笔?/font>

?#8220;排队现象”解困

    今年以来Q各银行|点的排队现象都比较严重。ؓ了解x队这个问题,Z的目光聚焦到ATMZ来?br>    银行个h金融部副ȝ理王毅告诉记者,他曾l到北京的一个网点当了一天大堂经理,l合其他部门反映上来的情况,他ȝ了出现排队问题的主要原因?br>    首先Q是股市q带下的基金火爆Q银行和客户都没有充分的思想准备。徏N行的基金代理业务是中间业务销售的重要一V与基金相关的业务需求量大增。几乎所有的商业银行都在U极承揽基金代销业务Q分享股市红利?br>    其次Q与银行的后台系l的服务能力有一定关pR银行的后台服务pȝ程仍然太复杂,需要不断优化。比如,在徏行买基金需要办理一张专用的卡,Z化流E,提高效率Q徏行将在年底取消这个环节?br>    W三Q与业务人员对业务的熟练E度和素质有兟뀂这里的业务人员不仅指柜员,q包括大堂经理。一个好的大堂经理可以通过对客L引导Q分掉那些能在ATMZ实现的业务,减轻柜面压力。另外,对公与对U业务的H口开设没有随着业务向q行及时调整Q出?#8220;对公业务闲得没事qԌ对私业务忙得一塌糊?#8221;现象?br>    从解x队问题这个角度看QATM机的布放合理和充一定程度上~解了眼下的排队问题?br>    工商银行个h金融业务部负责h介绍_针对今年出现的排队现象,要求复杂的业务和简单的业务区分开来;与此同时Q工行正在进行内部的程再造,q将使业务流E简z化。工商银行加大了营销宣传力度Q指导客h操作ATM机,d提示银行卡及ATMZ易的安全事项Q告知客LD情늚应急处理措施,努力为客h供便捷安全的ATM助服务环境。同Ӟ取现限额提高后,ATM机支付现金量随之增多,工商银行已要求全行根据辖内ATM机支付特点,合理定ATM机备付金填装量和加钞频率Q保证ATMZ用钞券的供应。据(zhn),今年QATM机开机率、正常运行率{指标较d提高Q受理业务量大幅增加。今q前5个月ATM机的累计交易量达?9618万笔Q篏计交易额?496亿元?br>    据透露Q工行将l箋加大自助机具的投攑֊度,在原?万台ATM机的基础上,今年再增5000台自动柜员机Q大量增讄Ҏ(gu)、登折机、补打发机{多功能自助讑֤Qƈ在现?700多家自助银行的基上,在大城市的繁华商业街区再多徏24时自助银行?br>    Z有效理和用ATM机,2003q_银行q发了“ATM机功能拓展和pȝ监控pȝ”Q对全行的ATM机实C后台l一控制。今q?月,人民银行每日自助设备提N额上调到2万元后,银行一周内在全国的ATMZ做了相应的调整。系l实现快速响应,是徏立在信息技术有力支撑的基础上的?/font>

从服务客户到盈利中心

    2003q_银行拥有的ATM不到1万台。而工商银行截?003q?月底Q投入用的ATM机已l达?2715収ͼ位居全国之首。王毅副ȝ理给记者算了一W̎Q从投入成本来看Q现在一台ATM备大U十几万元,便宜的只?0万元出头Q如果是集中采购Q费用还会再降下来一些。而通过实际计算Q徏行在pȝ上线后,在网点布放ATM机,投入使用后,通常1q就能收回成本。这里收入主要盈利的来源是跨行{账以及异地{账的收入手箋Ҏ(gu)入?/font>

    王毅_如果把其他行在徏行ATMZ提款的费用,与徏N行卡在其他银行提Ƅ手箋费对切后Q有一q仅此一,他们p?亿元。此外,异地跨行转̎的收入也相当可观QATM机替代h工网点还会给|点节约一大笔开销。̎清楚后Q徏行在ATM机的投入上进入加速期。截至今q?月,ATM机数量超q?万台?br>“ATM机功能拓展和pȝ监控pȝ”上线后,每台ATM机的投入和布放也不再?#8220;拍脑?#8221;式了。从后台监控室可以对布放在全国的2万多台ATMZM一台经营情늚数据调出来做分析。如果发现某一台ATM机布攑֐不能赚钱Q可以通过数据分析原因Q再Ҏ(gu)分析l果q行调整。ATM机挣q另外两个原因在于Q徏行有一套完整的|点选择程Q配套网点布攑֐理;有借记卡接q?亿,信用卡超q?000万,银行卡的z跃E度很高?/font>

    ?003q之前,银行的ATMZ论是操作pȝ、管理模式,q是操作界面{等是五花八门,杂ؕ无章Q在功能上仅限于取款、存?gu)ƾ、查询,非常单一。王毅说Q那Ӟ大家觉得ATMZ仅是l客h供服务的一U昂늚渠道Q完全是投入式的。但是,l过调研发现Q成本中心的观念不正,必须改变。ATM机完全可以成q工具Q要用经营的头脑来做ATM机。他下决心要一套系l来控制ATM机,使之成ؓ赚钱的机器?br>    2003q_北京发生非典之前的两个月Q王毅带领一队h马跑了国?个大城市Q找到这些城市最J华的街道去做ATM机的使用状况调研。比如,在南京的新街口(当地最J华的街道)Q他们对q条街上讄的每一安行的自助银行都进行了仔细观察Qƈ逐机操作Q把l果与徏行自qATM机加以比较。结果发玎ͼ各家银行的ATMZ是五花八门,功能各有千秋?br>    回北京后Q王毅带队,自己研发了一?#8220;ATM机功能拓展和pȝ监控pȝ”Qƈ为ATM机开发出46U功能(现发展ؓ五六十种功能Q,Ҏ(gu)ATM机布攄的情冉|选择Q开放一些适合当地的业务品U。还可以Ҏ(gu)业务需求量的不同,适当调整。系l可以在总行l一理全国ATM机,各省分行有一个管理中心,可以监控全省的ATM行情c?br>    自助服务区的比例Q徏行有一套标准,W合要求的都要安装ATM机等自助讑֤Q准备向l合|点发展。今q_q会增大ATM机的布设量,增设C么样的规模不好说。ATM机的盈利能力现在来看Q还处于一个上升期。尽徏行的ATM机增速很快,但是q没有因为投入量增长而每台ATM机的操作W数下降Q相反交易量q在不断上涨?/font>

安全Q道高一魔高一?/font>

    一扇窗户开启,伴随而来的安全问题不容忽视。ATM机的安全可以分ؓ两个层面Q一是系l运行的安全Q二是用户用ATM机环境的安全。据农行相关负责Zl,在系l安全运行上Q他们主要通过以下手段Q首先是通过全行的ATM机监控管理系l,对ATM行实时监控;其次是发生问题后通过短信、电(sh)话等方式及时联系相关的责Mh员及厂商q行l修Q第三,设有专门的ATM机管理员Q加强ATM机的日常l护Q第四,对离行式ATM机,通过定期巡检Q提高正常开机率和正常运行率Q第五,通过定期的数据分析,扑և每个片区乃至每台机具发生故障的频率和故障原因Qƈ制订相应的措施,预防与维护ƈ举?br>    王毅表示Q犯|分子的犯罪手段其实很低U,完全可以通过ATMZ讄相关的警CZ息,提醒消费者避免上此类信息的当。前q_当短信诈骗比较猖獗的时候,银行ATMZ也时有发生。原因在于徏N行当时是惟一一家开通了全国ATM{账功能的银行?#8220;当时的压力很大,考虑要不要关闭这功能。经q分析,我们采取了通过pȝ讄Q在的ATMZ讄相关提醒信息Q让用户一插卡q到这个提CZ息,骗术不攻自破?#8221;有一套完整的|点选择程。王毅说Q很多犯|䆾子的作案手段其实很低U,比如持卡h插卡后,犯罪嫌疑人突然在w后拍你QYUC西掉了,{消费者低头拣拄时候,把卡换了。徏行通过q程监控探头抓到q好几个犯罪嫌疑人。ATMZ的多数风险来源还是持卡h的疏忽。银行则需要通过各种途径对用卡hq行安全意识的宣传教Ԍ提高消费者的安全意识?/font>

竞争日趋Ȁ?/font>

    随着癑֧对自助设备接受程度的提高Q以及ATMZh(hun)g降,ATM机正成ؓ各商业银行竞争不可忽视的领域?br>    据中国银行信息科技部副ȝ理徐U恒介绍Q中行ATM机投入?0q以来,坚持以科技Z托,按照国际标准和国内外银行卡业发展势Q构建全新的、集中运作的银行卡运作体p,提升现有产品服务功能Q不断进行工作创C产品创新Q呈现出业务规模与经营效益双增长局面,提前实现人民币信用卡发卡量、国际信用卡发卡量和有效商户数量居业内第一的目标,外卡收单l箋雄居榜首的强劲发展势头?br>    据?zhn)Q目前,中国银行有贷记卡发卡?30万,借记卡发?.2亿张。̎户与客户q没有完全对应v来。每q新增ATM机在1500?000C_主要布放在包括:本行|点、自助银行以及大商场、机场、饭店等?br>    截至2007q第一季度Q中国银行可以办理个Z务的l合|点?0600Ӟ投ATM?1329収ͼ?089台在自助银行内,自助银行855家。在重点城市及其J华地段Q增加营业网点和ATM机等自助机具讑֤。在营业面积出200qxc的|点Q徏立自助银行或自助服务区,提高|点自助讑֤配备率,充分发挥|点自助渠道Ҏ(gu)C务的分流效用?br>    中行目前已经在ATMZ安装使用监控讑֤Q保障客戯金安全。随着中国银行实施|点转型Q简单业务将逐步q移臌助设备上?br>    徐纪恒副ȝ理透露Q目前,中国银行ATM机的q营由分行自行承担,部分分行选择了外包方式进行维护。中行正在开发新的核心应用系l,今年试点投Q明q将推广完成。新pȝ包括客户与账户的完全对应?br>    目前Q徏N行自助银行数量超q?000Ӟ行式自助银行不?00Ӟ行式ATM机将q?000台。据银行l计Q目前在ATMZ使用最多的是功能仍然是取款和查询,占总量?0%Q其ơ是转̎、存?gu)ƾ以及代~费业务?br>    曾一度落后于其他大型商行的中国农业银行也开始空前重视ATM机的布放和运营。截至今q上半年Q农行拥有ATM1.9万台Q发卡量总计U?.7亿张。去q农行抢占了北京地铁站内商机Q高密度地布放ATM机,由此获得相当可观的收益,地铁ATM行手l费收入已经过很多商业区的ATM机。针对北?008奥运商机Q北京农行的ATM?0Q以上开通了外卡取现功能?br>    中小银行因ؓ|点数量,无法与大银行以比高下Q也开始通过增加ATM机布攄方式弥补其网点不的劣势。据民生银行零售业务总部q行保障中心ȝ理项׃l,?003qvQ民生银行提在按揭、储蓄和自助银行业务上实C大突_总行在设备投入、h员配备等斚w鼎力支持。通过团队、激励机制等措施Q各分行加大了自助银行的投入Q布N度明显加快Q拓展重点从在行式{向离行式。目前,在线q行的ATMZ2003qv步时的几癑֏q速升臌3000収ͼ完成了民生银行自助银行业务的W一ơ飞跃。目前,在一些重点城市如北京、武汉、太原等Q民生的自助银行非常醒目。项pQ?#8220;对于民生银行q样一个新兴股份制商业银行来说Q除了把业务做精做好Q还要通过U极宣传逐渐赢得客户的信仅R毫无疑问,自助银行对于民生银行的Ş象宣传颇有益处?#8221;
    即ɘq入中国市场不久的外资银行,在ATM机发展方面也非常U极。目前,为配合不断增长的自助服务设施的需求,渣打银行?006q底前在中国重点城市讄?2台ATM机, q计划在q底前把ATM机的数量提高?00台。据(zhn),渣打银行已经与中国银联签U,成为其会员。届Ӟ渣打银行的ATM机系l与银联pȝ实行Ҏ(gu)Q可为客h供更方便的ATMZ的自助服务?br>    与此同时Q汇丰银行、花旗银行方面也在积极扩张网炏V花旗银?005q??日在上v东国际机场讄了第一台离行式柜员机。之后,与主要的战略伙伴诸如7-11便利店合作来拓展|络。截至今q?月,在全?所城市中共?4台ATM机,包括62台离行式?2台驻行式。花旗中国副行长g人零售业务主石安楠(Anand Selva)表示Q选址斚w主要有三斚w考虑Q便捷度、接触面和可视性。便捷度Q主要根据目标客L在商业、零售、住宅、娱乐和公用事业{物业Ş态中的步行流量和频率q行选址Q其中公用事业范围包括机场、火车站{。娱乐区域包括各大宾馆和像长城这L旅游胜地{。主要目的是Z增加我们客户日常生活的方便程度。接触面Q除了会在h密集度高的地方布点之外Q还会系l性地分散ATM机分布来扩大我们的接触面。可视性:选址{略的另一个重要目的是Z增加花旗银行品牌的知名度Q所以会选择人流量大的众多区域和地点。今后,致力于更多创新性的服务和解x案带到我们在中国的ATM机服务中来?/font>



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_w标?/title><link>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/37906.html</link><dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/dc:creator><author>奔跑的阿?/author><pubDate>Thu, 06 Dec 2007 08:19:00 GMT</pubDate><guid>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/37906.html</guid><wfw:comment>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/37906.html</wfw:comment><comments>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/37906.html#Feedback</comments><slash:comments>0</slash:comments><wfw:commentRss>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/37906.html</wfw:commentRss><trackback:ping>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/37906.html</trackback:ping><description><![CDATA[<span id="wcxhryt" class=newtext> _w公布其协议标准?br> <p><span id="blypvmp" class=featuretext>Getting message </span> <p><a href="mailto:anna@networldalliance.com?Subject=Getting message">Ann All, editor</a> <br> <p>• 09 Aug 2004<br><br>For those not there when Bob Dylan picked up an electric guitar in front of audiences for the first time, in 1966, the only way to hear the music was to purchase one of a myriad of bootleg recordings made during the tour.</p> <p>Twenty-two years after an especially incendiary performance at Royal Albert Hall, Dylan's record label released an "official" version of the concert with re-mastered, state-of-the-art sound. The result: a renewed appreciation of Dylan's role in shaping popular music.</p> While it's too soon to predict if <a >Triton</a> will garner the same kind of enthusiasm with its decision to publicly release its Triton Standard ATM message specification, early reaction appears to be mostly of the "rock on" variety. <p>"If more vendors were as open as Triton, all of our lives would be a little less complicated," said Chris Klein, executive vice president of marketing for <a >Mosaic Software</a>, developer of the Postilion transaction processing platform.</p> <p>"For businesses like ACI it means supporting less device handlers and the associated maintenance like Triple DES, EMV and remote key downloading," agreed Rick DuVall, a senior product manager for <a >ACI Worldwide,</a> developer of the BASE24 transaction processing platform. "For customers, it means not having to purchase and maintain additional device handlers. It gives them the ability to shop multiple ATM vendors more easily."</p> <p><strong>A little history</strong></p> <p>Message specifications like Triton Standard dictate how ATMs communicate with host processors and vice versa. Triton was one of the early pioneers of creating specifications for ATMs using dial-up communications.</p> <p>The first dial-up specification was created by Tidel in 1992 for its AnyCard ATM. Like Triton, Tidel based the spec on the Visa II protocol, which had been developed for point-of-sale terminals. Transaction processor ACS helped produce the spec.</p> <p>Also in 1992, Triton began developing a spec for its Scrip Jr terminal, working with transaction processor Intercept. </p> <p>Before the introduction of dial-up ATMs in the early '90s, all ATMs used leased line communications. Host processors created configurations of  "states and screens" for each ATM operation. Leased-line terminals collect information when a customer requests a particular type of transaction and transmit it to the host; the host then downloads the appropriate configuration.</p> <p>The approach wasn't appropriate for retail ATMs, said Bill Jackson, Triton's vice president of research and development. "Programming screens for each terminal by the host is time consuming, so a different model was needed."</p> <p>So Triton and Tidel modeled their retail ATMs on POS terminals, with the ATM containing all of the screens, states and programming it needs to perform transactions.</p> <p>This approach makes terminal set-up and configuration "trivial" and supports communication using a far less expensive dial-up telephone line, Jackson said.</p> <p>Because of the newness of dial-up ATMs, Jackson said, Triton had to develop a new interface each time it signed with a new transaction processor. "The interface had to match something they already supported. The message formats were all similar; the same information was needed to do the job - but it was always arranged in a different way."</p> <p>By 1996, Jackson said Triton had developed more than a half dozen formats for a like number of processors. </p> <p>"We could not make changes or add new features because the host was in charge of the format. They supported other devices with the same format and did not want to change just for us," he said. "This made life miserable for programmers at Triton. We were supporting lots of versions of code and had to know what processor a customer was using before we built the terminal. Changing processors in the field meant a complete software reload and configuration."</p> <p>A new relationship with Concord EFS (then EPS) in 1996 marked a change. Concord offered to write code to support Triton's ATMs. "Up to that point in time, no one wrote code to support us. We wrote code to support them," Jackson said.</p> <p>Triton kept the Visa II protocol but started with a clean slate for the Concord message format itself, Jackson said. Based on its previous experiences with complicated, processor-specific modifications, the manufacturer built the message structure in a way that allowed for modification with no changes to the original framework.</p> <p>"A brand new RL5000 (Triton's newest and most advanced ATM) could be supported by any processor that wrote software based on the first release of Triton Standard. A 9500 (last manufactured in 1997) would work perfectly with any processor today even if they were supporting the latest version of Triton Standard," he explained. "The goal was to have the version of any terminal code be fully compatible with any version of host processor code, no matter how old or new either was."</p> <p><strong>Form of flattery?</strong></p> <p>Because of the popularity of its 9600 ATM, Triton was able to convince processors to support the new standard. Today, some 50 processors around the world do so, Jackson said. </p> <p>It has become so popular that a number of other manufacturers, including several of the largest in the world, emulate it. Such emulation occurs, said ACI's DuVall, because "it's easier for new players to get into the market by emulating someone else rather than convincing companies like ACI to build new device handlers."</p> <p>Indeed, many manufacturers also emulate 911/912, a Diebold message format, and NDC/NDC+, an NCR message format. Fujitsu's Prism software, which Triton has licensed for use with its new Windows-based ATMs, features Diebold 912 emulation.</p> <p>Jackson believes the widespread practice of emulation is tolerated -- though not encouraged -- because ultimately it helps facilitate development of new ATM applications. </p> <p>Noting that Triton's specification has been shared with partners like Mosaic Software and ACI under non-disclosure agreements, he said, "Triton has never pursued any kind of legal action against anyone, manufacturer or processor. As far as I know, neither have NCR or Diebold. I think this is because each emulates the other and what goes around, comes around. We do not sanction or condone (emulation), but also do not actively discourage it."</p> <p><strong>Cleaner copy</strong></p> <p>Triton hopes that offering freer access to its specification will result in "cleaner" emulations, with less testing and development required for software developers and processors, Jackson said.</p> <p>"If the specification isn't officially open, the emulators, due to a lack of knowledge, eventually drift away from the official specification and companies like ACI are forced to support these nuances in order to keep our customers content," DuVall said. </p> <p>Offering new functionality should become quicker and easier for manufacturers currently emulating Triton that choose to adopt Triton Standard, said Mike Cowart, operations director, ATM Services for transaction processor Lynk Systems.</p> <p>Lynk and other processors "make enhancements and updates to Triton Standard first, then look at emulations," Cowart said.</p> <p>Brad Zerman, president of <a >Qualtex Corporation</a>, which manufactures the WeatherMaster ATM, said Triton's decision to open its spec "is huge for us."</p> <p>His company is considering entering the burgeoning retail ATM market in the United Kingdom. Developing support for EMV, a smart card standard mandated in the UK, would have been costly, he said. "Triton already supports EMV, so that will allow us to minimize our development costs if and when we decide to enter that market."</p> <p><strong>Open issues</strong></p> <p>Triton originally intended to post the Triton Standard spec on its Web site. Due to security concerns, Jackson said it will post a request form instead. It will not collect a license fee, or otherwise charge anyone to use it.</p> <p>"We are modifying the plan to give it to anyone that legitimately could use it, including competitors, but with a non-disclosure agreement of some kind. While we will continue to help any legitimate processor to develop drivers for it, we will not provide any technical assistance or help to any competitor," he said.</p> <p>Jackson said Triton hopes to accelerate the development of new ATM features and functionality. "We have always solicited feedback from processors on what we could do to enhance the specification. We do not expect to solicit feedback from competitors; we will not ignore it, either."</p> <p>By opening its standard, Triton could "theoretically lose some market share due to removing a barrier to other entrants," said ACI's DuVall.</p> <p>Jackson said the manufacturer hopes Triton Standard will become a communications-independent standard for entry-level ATMs, much as IFX is becoming a standard for more sophisticated machines. <br> <br>"Open standards are good for the industry and will be good for Triton," he said.</p> <p>At least one competitor worries that encouraging adoption of existing vendor standards, including Triton Standard, could slow a broad move to IFX.</p> <p>"IFX is not solely being driven by ATM manufacturers; rather it is being driven by the financial industry as a whole. It is the first time a standard has been defined whereby institutions can truly influence what functionality each ATM provider, switch vendor or network provider should implement to meet the customer business needs," said Joe Gallagher, general manager of Software and Services for NCR's Financial Solutions division. "Releasing or advocating adoption of existing vendor standards will not encourage the industry at large to move to IFX and could potentially slow the pace of adoption."</p> SourceQ?a >http://www.atmmarketplace.com/article.php?id=4938&na=1</a></span> <img src ="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/aggbug/37906.html" width = "1" height = "1" /><br><br><div align=right><a style="text-decoration:none;" href="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/" target="_blank">奔跑的阿?/a> 2007-12-06 16:19 <a href="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/37906.html#Feedback" target="_blank" style="text-decoration:none;">发表评论</a></div>]]></description></item><item><title>国居民利用ATM的Y件漏z透支取款被判入狱10q?/title><link>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/16464.html</link><dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/dc:creator><author>奔跑的阿?/author><pubDate>Thu, 14 Dec 2006 14:43:00 GMT</pubDate><guid>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/16464.html</guid><wfw:comment>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/16464.html</wfw:comment><comments>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/16464.html#Feedback</comments><slash:comments>2</slash:comments><wfw:commentRss>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/16464.html</wfw:commentRss><trackback:ping>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/16464.html</trackback:ping><description><![CDATA[ <h1 class="red"> <h1 class="red"> <font size="3">Woman steals thousands from ATM</font> </h1> </h1> <div id="bwypgjh" class="subhead"> <div id="igtctzr" class="subhead"> <font size="2"> <b>Glitch let cash flow freely after Katrina</b> </font> </div> </div> <div id="civtgxz" class="byln"> <font size="2">Thursday, December 07, 2006 </font> <div> <div> <font size="2">By Matt Scallan<br /><br />(本文转蝲?<a class="" title="" target="_blank">http://www.nola.com/search/index.ssf?/base/news-3/1165474781197240.xml?NERP&coll=1</a>)<br /><br />[Michael]: 前不久在本hw边发生过cM情况,国内客户在一ATM(自动柜员?上取ƾ时发现ATM软g的漏z??00元帐户只被扣1?,于是拼命取款上十万最l辞d?逃离Z视线.<br /> D不知本文中该美国居民因cM事g被FBIq查q被送上法庭,最l以<font size="3"><strong>盗窃|?/strong></font>被判处臛_10q的徒刑,q追加一定的|款.<br /><br /><br /></font> </div> </div> <b> </b> </div> <p> <font size="2">A Destrehan woman with $600 in her credit union account took advantage of a software glitch to steal more than $14,000 with her ATM card in the weeks after Hurricane Katrina, U.S. Attorney Jim Letten said Wednesday. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Shelita Grandpre, 32, pleaded guilty to bank larceny charges in U.S. Eastern District Court last week after admitting that she knowingly spent the money after discovering a software glitch in the ASI Federal Credit Union's ATM software that allowed customers to withdraw unlimited amounts of cash and make unlimited purchases with their debit cards. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Five other ASI members have pleaded guilty to similar charges. The Elmwood-based credit union has 14 branches in Orleans, Jefferson, St. Tammany, St. Charles, Lafourche and Evangeline parishes. <br /></font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Audrey Cerise, ASI's chief executive officer, said credit union officers discovered the glitch three days after the storm after the institution transferred its operations to another company when the power failed at its Jefferson Parish headquarters. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">"We had a choice. We could have cut off ATM services for all of our members, or we could take the chance on losing some money," she said. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Many of the credit union's members who evacuated from the storm took advantage of the glitch and withdrew more than they had in their accounts. But the vast majority repaid the money after the storm, Cerise said. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">"Our faith was not misplaced," Cerise said. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Cerise said many who withdrew more than they had thanked her employees for letting them make overdrafts in the weeks after the storm. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">"I don't know that I wouldn't have done the same thing in their shoes," she said. "They didn't have money for food. They didn't have money for gas." </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Cerise said the credit union has moved to avoid repeating the problem by mirroring its computerized transactions at its Ville Platte branch, rather than using an outside vendor. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">According to Grandpre's guilty plea, she made withdrawals and purchases totaling $14,056.21 in the Monroe, Baton Rouge and New Orleans areas between Aug. 30, 2005, and Sept. 17, 2005. She admitted to FBI agents that she knowingly overdrafted her account, Letten said. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Grandpre pleaded guilty to bank larceny and could be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Sentencing is scheduled for March 6 before U.S. District Judge Jay Zainey. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Others who have pleaded guilty on similar charges, along with the amount they are accused of overdrafting, are Renesha Brown of New Orleans, $8,483; Chassity Deshone Hulbert Irving of New Orleans, $18,334; Michelle Taylor of New Orleans, $7,488; Charlotte J. Whitley of Gretna, $8,024; and her daughter, Graylyn Whitley of New Orleans, $7,943. The defendants are set to be sentenced early next year. <br /></font> </p> <p> <font size="2">More cases are pending, Letten said. </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">. . . . . . . </font> </p> <p> <font size="2">Matt Scallan may be reached at mscallan@timespicayune.com or (985) 652-0953. </font> </p> <img src ="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/aggbug/16464.html" width = "1" height = "1" /><br><br><div align=right><a style="text-decoration:none;" href="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/" target="_blank">奔跑的阿?/a> 2006-12-14 22:43 <a href="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/16464.html#Feedback" target="_blank" style="text-decoration:none;">发表评论</a></div>]]></description></item><item><title>六款W合WOSA/XFS标准的ATMC软ghttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/14662.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Sat, 04 Nov 2006 05:37:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/14662.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/14662.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/14662.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/14662.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/14662.html 六款W合WOSA/XFS标准的ATMC软g
Michael 2006q?1??br />

DieboldQUSAQ? Agilis
FujitsuQJAPANQ? Prism
NCRQUSAQ? APTRA
KALQUKQ? Kalignite
Phoenix InteractiveQCANADAQ? VISTAatm
Wincor-NixdorfQGERMANYQ? ProTopas


]]>20世纪“金钱”技术十大发明(下)http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11753.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Sun, 27 Aug 2006 08:17:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11753.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/11753.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11753.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/11753.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/11753.htmlMichael 2006q??7?br />
6Q信用卡QCredit CardQ? 1950

    1950q_Frank McNamaraQ“晚俱乐部”(Diners' ClubQ的创办者,被公认ؓ发明了首张统一信用卡。Frank?00名顾客发行了该卡Q用于在国U约?7安馆消贏V?958q_国快递公司(American ExpressQ也发行了其l一信用卡?br />    信用卡行业实际上?0世纪30q代已l在国成ŞQ当Ӟ一些燃油公司和q锁旅店向顾客发放信用卡Q用于在他们自己的加油站和旅馆刷卡消贏V?br />    二战期间Q大量的资金被投入到政府的军事战争中。男人奔赴战场,使得工商业的中心向战争用品上转移。二战结束后Q家庭重_国l济重新回到了普通客L消费行业Q因而公众又开始热衷于使用信用卡?br />    银行信用卡,是在20世纪50q代才出现的。在当时Q许多金融机构纷U盟组成今天我们看到的一些主要信用卡公司?951q_U约的弗兰克林国安行(Franklin National BankQ发行了W一张真正的信用卡?966q??6日,多家银行联合l徏了今天的万事辑օ司(MarsterCardQ?br />    1958q末Q美国银行(Bank of AmericaQ发行了BankAmericardQ现在的Visa卡)Q第一张银行信用卡。他们最初仅供销售h员出行用?0世纪60q代早期Q越来越多的公司开始发行信用卡Qƈ在广告上声称“它不是信用的Ş式,而是一U节U时间的讑֤”?br />    国快递和万事辑օ怸夜暴富,因他们向一些不需要信用卡的h大量邮递卡片,70q代中期Q美国国会不得不颁布法o制止q种行ؓQƈ对信用卡行业q行了规范整ѝ?br />    今天QVisa、MasterCard和American Express已经成ؓ了世界知名的品牌?br />
    C会贡献Q信用卡的出现点燃了Z的消费热情。它在h们就业,旅行{方面v着重要作用。同Ӟ因ؓ信用卡的钱是无Ş的,很多人因它而破产?br />
7Q条形码QBarcodeQ?1952

    条Ş码最初用于铁\pȝ中,用于记录每个车厢用了哪种引擎。条形码打印在R厢的边上Q在地面的某个高度上安装有一个专门的pȝ。后来,商业界意识到了这个系l的价|q些铁\条Ş码也演变成今天我们所熟?zhn)的统一产品标识码(UPC-Uniform Product CodeQ了?br />    1932q_Wallace FlintW一个提出构动结系l(Automated Checkout SystemQ的xQ虽然他的方案经上不可行,但是Q这个方案的提出向今天的条Ş码迈Z重要的一步?0q后QFlint作ؓ国家食物q锁协会QNational Association of Food ChainsQ的副总裁Q力U自动结系l的开发研IӞ于是产生了UPC?br />    20世纪40q代末期Q超市业向费城的Drexel理工学院h开发一套柜台结自动化的方案。当Ӟ柜员需要花费大量的旉在给客户l算上,而且在录入货品数据的时候经常出现错误。院长拒l了q个目Q但是一位机械工E专业的讲师QInstructorQNorman Joseph Woodland和他的朋友Bernard Bob Silver两h接收了这个项目,1952q_他们一赯得了专利?br />    后来QJoseph Woodland入职IBM公司Q他利用自己的发明开始开发自动化的结柜台?959q成功开发出了原型,但是一pd行性研I报告他决定暂停这个项目。后来Philco公司从Woodland和Silver那购Cq项专利Q此后不久,Philco公司又把专利转卖l了RCA公司。RCA的Francis Beck刉了一个自动化l算柜台q获得专利?br />    1972q?月,俄亥俄州Kenwood城的Kroger's成ؓW一家完全自动化的超市?973q_Beck的一个自动化l算柜台原型被陈列在Smithsonian的美国历史国家博物馆?br />    1974q??6日,一个巨大的Wrigley's Spearmint口香p连同今天的UPC码成为第一个被扫描的商品,标志着条Ş码世界的开始?br />   
    C会贡献Q条形码衍生Z数据挖掘领域Qh们可以通过数据挖掘技术预知品的通和销售信息。这些信息可以帮忙发掘h们需要的产品Q从而减库存成本,深入理解供应链,购买模式以及大量的其它特性?br />
8Q智能卡QSmart CardQ-1974

    微芯之父Roland MorenoQ?974q?月获得了卡的W一专利。多q后卡首ơ发行,但是反应q_^。这些刚发行的卡非常先进但是造h(hun)相当昂贵?br />    1978q电(sh)子元件的体积大大~小Q得大规模生通用卡成为可能。自那以后,需求不断上升,现在我们几乎可以在世界上每一个角落看到智能卡?br />   
    C会贡献Q?卡允许存储更多复杂的信息Q包括资金可从中心{Ud卡上
QMovement of currency from the center(credit card centralized network) to the edges(stored value on the card)Q。虽然智能卡的应用领域涉及多个方面,但是它带来的真正的社会变革还有待察觉Q因来越多的交易信息会被直接存储在卡里?br />
9Q电(sh)子数据表QSpreadsheetQ-1978

    会计表单已经存在CU,但是Dan Bricklin的电(sh)子数据表不仅使会计业发生了变革,而且成ؓ了个人电(sh)脑的首个杀手锏应用?br />    1961q_加州大学伯克力分校(UC BerkeleyQ教授Richard Mattessich?961q?月刊的《The Accounting Review》上发表论文“预模型和pȝ模拟”(Budgeting Models and System SimulationQ,以及随后的两本著作《会计和分析Ҏ(gu)》(Accounting and Analytical MethodsQ、《企业通过计算机预程序的模拟》(Simualtion of the Firm Through a Budget Computer ProgramQ首ơ提Z开发电(sh)子化表单的想法。在那两本著作中Q还l出了由Mattessich教授的两位助理研I员采用FORTRAN IV语言~写的计机E序模拟Q他们分别是Tom C.Schneider?Paul A. Zitlau.
    然而,Mattessich的工作ƈ没有带来很大的媄响。随后,Bricklinl箋推进Q开发了?sh)子数据表单领域的第一个可用品,他因此成Z?sh)子数据表单之父?br />    当时Dan Bricklin正在为哈?jng)商学院QHarvard Business SchoolQ的“案例分析”(Case StudyQ报告准备一份数据表单分析,他要么只能手动制作一个,要么使用一个极隄的时间共享的LE序。Bricklin认ؓ一定存在更好的办法来制作表单,他希望有q么一个程序:Z可以看到创徏表单的全q程。他的想法意味着“在教室里存在一只电(sh)子黑板和?sh)子_笔”(an electronic blackboard and electronic chalk in a classroomQ?br />    1978q秋QBricklin已经用整数BASIC(Interger BasicQ语a~写Z他概念中的第一个原型程序。这个程序帮助用戯入和操作一?0?列的矩阵。第一个版本功能比较简单,所以Bricklin找来在麻省理工大学(MITQ的熟hBob Frankston改善和扩充这个程序的功能?br />    VisiCalc产品从诞生到推出市场Qd卖出了约1百万套电(sh)子数据表单程序?br />    20世纪80q代早期Q电(sh)子数据表单的市场q速发展,但VisiCalc的股东对采用Intel芯片的IBM PC?sh)脑的出现反应不够灵敏?983q?月始QVisiCorp和Software Arts公司的法律纠UVisiCalc开发者Bricklin和Frankston的注意力转移Q这D|_Mitch Kapor开发了LotusQ其?sh)子数据表单E序q速成Z?sh)子表单行业新标准?br />    紧接着的下一个时代随着微YExcel表单的出现而开始?987q微软启动Windows操作pȝQExcel是随之一起发布的应用软g之一?989q末QWindows 3.0获得用户的大量认可,此时QExcel已经成ؓ了微软的旗舰产品?br />
    C会贡献Q?现在个h和企业都可以做复杂得多的财务规划、研I和场景开发(development of scenariosQ工作。数字可以用方程来表C,q样表单中的信息可以随着一个值的改变而全部更新?br />
10QRSA加密 Q?1983

    RSA密钥最大的贡献在于它允许在多用L环境下加减密Q换句话_加密数据方和解密数据方不需要直接的参与交互?br />    RSA法?976-1977q在国ȝ理工学院的计机U学实验室由Ronald Rivest QAdi  Shamir 和Len  Adelman三h发明Q“RSA”一词源自每人的名字首字母?br />    他们三h发明RSA法前受CWhitfield Diffie和Martin Hellman在斯坦福大学的工作的启发QDiffie和Hellman两h都曾一直在研究探烦多用L加密技术?br />    Rivest有一ơ在长椅上接受头痛治疗时冒出q么一个构建RSApȝ的想法,它基于这样一个思\Q把两个大质数相乘很Ҏ(gu)得到一个更大的敎ͼ但是从一个大数却很难扑ֈ它的最因子。密文通讯依赖于通讯双方分别持有一公钥和一U钥。只要从某方处获得公钥,那么有可能在约定的法下和Ҏ(gu)交换U文信息?br />    在RSA三h演示他们的系l之前,Rivest得到一位来自国家安全部QNational Security AdministrationQ工作h员的联系Qƈ被警告如果他在即召开的会议上演示q个加密法Q他可能面(f)触犯1954军事理行ؓ条例Q?954 Munitins Control ActQ的危险。这个条例规定Q何h不得对外出授密钥知识Q因为在卛_举行的会议上有许多外籍人士参加Q他很可能将会泄露被止出授的加密技术。MIT出面和NSAq行q涉q解决了该问题,后来NSA解释道那位工作h员的行ؓq不代表安全部,而仅属个径?br />    MIT军_对这个算法申请专利,但因为在递交甌之前它已l被公开q,所以无法获得批准(it couldn't get foreign rights to itQ?983q??0日,MIT获得了专利,q特许RSA Security公司使用?br />   
    C会贡献Q?加密是在公共信息|(包括因特|)上进行私Z息交换的必须手段。个人权利和政府职能之间的斗争将军_于多交换信息是在政府允许的辖范围之内?br />
l论
   
    也许q行q项10大技术研I最h义的部分在于探究一U新技术从开发到被大众市场接受所需要的旉。比如ATMQ它l历?0多年。我们对没有映入众h眼帘的技术常感到好奇Q他们在可以真正获得市场的馈赠前匆匆离开了我们的视线?br />
    q有一些新技术正在“金钱”世界里开拓前行,微支付技术(Micropayment technologiesQ,预付信用卡(Prepaid credit cardsQ,Ud支付pȝQMobile payment systemQ以及生物识别技术(BiometricsQ都是充满希望的行业。公共政{?public policy decisions)Q经环?General economic conditions)Q资金储?financial backing)Q果断决{?sheer determination)以及初始团队的组l,是我们前行道\上媄响输赢的主要因素?br />
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20世纪“金钱”技术十大发明(上)http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11592.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Tue, 22 Aug 2006 16:45:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11592.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/11592.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11592.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/11592.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/11592.html 20世纪“金钱”技术十大发?/font>
注:本文在Thomas Frey, Executive Director of the DaVinci Institute的文章基上整理编写?/font>
Michael 2006q??3?/font>

达芬奇学院的研究组耗时六月搜集整理了近N在金钱领域的创新技术,q由?/font> 院成员及专家按照影响力的大小Ҏ(gu)Ҏ(gu)术进行了评分。一些技术发明如售货?/font> QVENDING MACHINE)Q旅行支?TRAVELERS CHEQUES)Q和SLOT MACHINES因ؓ发明 ?9世纪而没有被选进来。我们的目标主要集中在上世U的创新技术。有些?/font> ?0世纪90q代的技术因为其影响没有以下q些那么大而没有在名单之列?br />以下是十大技术:
1Q电(sh)子现金收入记录机QELECTRONIC CASH REGISTERQ- 1906

国发明家Charles Franklin Kettering(1876-1958)?906q发明了世界上第一台ECRQ?/font> ?904q毕业于国俄亥俄州州立大学Q工E专业。他一生A(ch)献显著,获得q?40?/font> 专利技术ƈ享有q?0所大学的荣誉博士头衔。先后Q职于NCR, DELCO, GM?/font>

C会贡献QECR的出Cؓ后来的交易数据收集与分析铺^了道路,q之生了现在 的预分析模型QPredictive ModelingQ和存货控制?/font>

2Q电(sh)子货?Q?1918

1918q美联储银行(Federal Reserve Banks)通过甉|的Ş式{U资金,q是?sh)子货?/font> 的第一ơ出现。然而,?sh)子货币的广泛用直?972q美联储讄自动清算中心QA CH-Automated Clearing HouseQ后才开始,q个清算中心用于l美国胦攉K及商业银 行提供电(sh)子Ş式的支票处理。紧接着cM的系l在Ƨ洲也逐渐出现Q因此电(sh)子货?/font> 的广泛用实际上已经持箋?0多年?/font>

C会贡献Q?br />    今天Q世界上所有银行系l的货币支付几乎都是通过一pd的跨行网l进行电(sh)?/font> 处理。其中,U约清算中心q行操作的CHIPS(Clearing House Interbank Payments System)是最大的|络之一Q它主要处理巨额资金的{帐?994qCHIPS和Fedwir eQ美联储|络pȝQ联合处理了11750万笔交易QMh(hun)?066千亿金?br />    虽然银行已经采用?sh)子货币转帐?0多年Q但是直到最q,它才真正意义上地?/font> 普通消费者用v来。计机功能的日益强大和成本的羃减,以及使全球交互成?/font> 大大降低的现代网l通讯技术的发展Q这些因素已l得全球数百万的个人用戯 行电(sh)子货币{帐成为现实。因此,?sh)子货币的出现让我们见证了数字经发展的?/font> 期阶Dc?/font>

3Q第一辆运钞RQ?920

    有些芬奇(Leonardo da Vinci)发明了装甲RQ实际上不是。今天的装甲?/font> 需要追t到1920q美国明D辑ַ圣保|的W一辆商用装甲R的出现?/font>

    C会贡献Q运钞R的出C得巨额现金的q送更快更安全Q银行不需要手握大?/font> 现金而进行{送?/font>

4Q信用机构-1937
   
    19世纪30q代Q商人Lewis Tappan在曼哈顿Z哥哥的丝l批发生意做客户信用?/font> 评定Qƈ利用处理生成的大量信用记录做Z们开展业务的斚w。Tappan意识C 们做批发生意旉要信用记录这一点将会g伸到其他需要信息的供应商上。通过?/font> 门处理这些信用信息ƈ提供l其他供应商QTappan认识Cl济学家门所U的“规?/font> l济”,q帮忙创立了国信用报告业务QBusiness of credit reportingQ。Tappan和全 国的代理及通讯C订合同,开辟专栏讨论当C业的特点、运行状况以及未来前 景。他创立了一个信息中心可快速地提供信息咨询。Tappan的信息中心后来成Z 所周知的R.G.Dun&Co.公司Q?933q和Bradstreet公司合ƈ成立了Dun&BradstreetQ现?/font> 已经占据了商业信用报告领域业务?br />   
    C会贡献Q今天在国有三大信用报告系l-Equifax, Experian, Trans UnionQ每?/font> pȝ拥有大量的小型的附属信用机构?998qACB(Associated Credit Bureau)在整个美 国拥?91个成员机构,每年出售6亿䆾信用报告?/font>

5Q自动柜员机QATM-Automatic Teller MachineQ-1939

    Luther George SimjianQ?905Q?997Q,发明Ӟ出生于土耛_Q?920q移居美?/font> ?939q他刉了世界上第一台ATMQ但是ATM发明者的头衔q不属于他?br />    1939qSimjian刉出W一台ATMQ获得了20相关专利(很多在今天的ATM中仍?/font> 使用Q,当时很多银行对这U机器持怀疑态度Q最lSimjian说服了现在的花旗银行Q?/font> CitiBankQƈ同意试用6个月。但是,银行最lƈ没有接受q种机器Q因为需求不?/font> 当时Simjian写道Q“看来用这U机器的人只是一部分的妓女和赌徒,因ؓ他们?/font> x受柜台服务员当面的服务”。Simjian因而不再对它进行进一步的研究和推销?br />    1968q_Donald WetzelQ当时Docutel公司产品规划部的副总裁Q在达拉斯一安行排 队等候服务的时候,萌生了制造ATM机器的想法。Docutel的首席机械工E师Tom Barnes和电(sh)子工E师George ChastainQ和Donal Wetzel一赯?00万美金开始开发第 一台现代意义上的ATMQƈ?969q生雏形?973qDocutel公司获得一专利?br />    W一台ATM在美国纽U的化工银行QChemical BankQ安装用。它ȝ工作Q对 使用客户的信用要求较高?br />    WetzelQBarnesQChastain三h开发了W一张真正的ATM卡,持卡人根据卡中的道数据 和个人密码从ATM获取现金。这三h共同发明了ATM而被铭记史册?/font>

    C会贡献Q如今ATM被安装在银行和服务场所每个角落Q给客户提供了快h?/font> 的现金及各种其他服务?/font>



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如何在ATM上实现EMV交易http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11042.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Wed, 09 Aug 2006 05:39:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11042.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/11042.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/11042.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/11042.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/11042.html如何在ATM上实现EMV交易
Michael 2006q???br />
卛_推出?/font>


因近日工作繁?于他日闲暇旉再写.(2006-10)


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EMV交易q程解析之十一 Completionhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10422.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Mon, 24 Jul 2006 13:44:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10422.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/10422.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10422.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/10422.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/10422.htmlEMV交易q程解析之十一 Completion
Michael 2006q??4?br />
1 /* ----------------------------------------------------------------
2 名称QCompletion
3 参数Q?br /> 4         无?br /> 5 处理Q?br /> 6         q是EMV交易的终点站?br /> 7         ICC卡返回TC(Transaction CertificateQ当响应W一ơGENERATE AC命o)或者AAC(Application Authentication CryptogramQ当响应W二ơGENERATE AC命o)l终端预CICCҎ(gu)有EMV函数的执行结束(x权或者拒l交易)?br /> 8 ----------------------------------------------------------------- */


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EMV交易q程解析之十 Issuer-to-Card Script Processinghttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10421.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Mon, 24 Jul 2006 13:43:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10421.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/10421.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10421.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/10421.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/10421.htmlEMV交易q程解析之十 Issuer-to-Card Script Processing
Michael 2006q??4?br />
 1 /**//*----------------------------------------------------------------
 2名称QIssuer-to-Card Script Processing
 3参数Q?br /> 4        [IN] Authorization Response MessageQ包含Issuer Script - Tag'71' or '72'Q?br /> 5        [OUT] TVR(Terminal Verification Result)
 6        [OUT] TSI(Transaction Status Information)
 7处理Q?br /> 8        q是发卡?ICC)和发卡行自n(L)之间的又一ơ对话?br /> 9        L可以在发l终端的交易响应包中包含一些特D命令的脚本
10Q比如unblocking of an offline PIN命oQ对于不同的发卡行命令E异所以由发卡行直接发送)供ICC执行Q终端只要将q些命o转发lICC卛_?br />11        具体圎ͼl端接收C机的交易响应包后取出ICC执行脚本(Issuer Script-Tag'71' or '72'Q 每个响应包中可能包含多个执行脚?Q终端对每个执行脚本q行解析得到该脚本的ICC命o序列(Tag-'86')Q然后逐一按序lICC发送ICC命oQ如果ICC执行该命令失败则该脚本的后箋命o不再执行Q脚本执行结束;如果该命令执行成功则l箋执行后箋解析出来的命令,直到所有命令执行成功后该脚本的执行成功完成?br />12        只要脚本被执行则讄TSI?Script processing was performed"?Q若执行p|则设|TVR的相应位?Q对Tag'71'?72'的脚本设|的TVR位不同)?br />13-----------------------------------------------------------------*/


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EMV交易q程解析之九(ji) Online Processinghttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10420.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Mon, 24 Jul 2006 13:41:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10420.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/10420.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10420.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/10420.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/10420.htmlEMV交易q程解析之九(ji) Online Processing
Michael 2006q??4?br />
 1 /* ----------------------------------------------------------------
 2 名称QOnline Processing
 3 参数Q?br />  4         [IN] ARQC(Authorization Request Cryptogram)
 5         [IN] AIP(Application Interchange Profile)
 6         [OUT] TVR(Terminal Verification Result)
 7         [OUT] TSI(Transaction Status Information)
 8 处理Q?br />  9         q是发卡?ICC)和发卡行自n(L)之间的一ơ对话?br /> 10         当终端收到ICC的ARQC决策旉要进行在U授权?br /> 11         具体圎ͼARQCQ用发卡行的密钥对交易数据进行运得到的一D代码)被包含在交易h包中发送给LQ主行授权确认后q回交易响应包?br /> 12         如果交易响应包中包含IAD(Issuer Authentication Data - tag'91')Q终端检查AIP值看ICC是否支持IA(Issuer Authentication)Q如果支持则l端lICC发送EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE命oQ一ơ交易只能发一ơ)Q根据ICCq回的命令执行结果设|TVR相应位。若l端不支持IA或交易响应包没有IAD数据Q则不发送Q何命令?br /> 13         若EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATIE命o有被发送,则设|TSI的相应位??br /> 14 ----------------------------------------------------------------- */


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EMV交易q程解析之八 Card Action Analysishttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10312.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Fri, 21 Jul 2006 07:11:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10312.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/10312.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10312.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/10312.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/10312.htmlEMV交易q程解析之八 Card Action Analysis
Michael 2006q??1?br />
 1/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 2名称QCard Action AnalysisQ卡行ؓ决策Q?br /> 3参数Q?br /> 4        [IN] GENERATE AC Command
 5        [IN] CDOL(Card Risk Management Data Object List)
 6        [IN] AIP(Application Interchange Profile)
 7        [OUT] TSI(Transaction Status Information)
 8        [OUT] GENERATE AC Response
 9处理Q?br />10        卡行为决{,卛_l端发下来的GENERATE AC命oq行处理q做出响应(ȝ拒绝Q在U授权,在线'冲正'q是ȝ授权Q,以对发卡行的风险q行理。不同于l端行ؓ(Terminal Action Analysis)的查表决{,发卡行如何处理AC命o及做何种响应完全由发卡行自n军_QEMVq无规定?br />11-----------------------------------------------------------------*/


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EMV交易q程解析之七 Terminal Action Analysishttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10310.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Fri, 21 Jul 2006 07:04:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10310.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/10310.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10310.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/10310.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/10310.htmlEMV交易q程解析之七 Terminal Action Analysis
Michael 2006q??1?br />
 1/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 2名称QTerminal Action AnalysisQ终端行为决{)
 3参数Q?br /> 4        [IN] TVR(Terminal Verification Result)
 5        [IN] IAC(Issuer Action Codes)Q和TVR完全一L数据l构Q记录了针对TVR中每位结果应采取的决{包括离U授权,ȝ拒绝或在U授权。IAC包括:
 6              Issuer Action Code - Denial (Tag '9F0E'), 默认gؓ?
 7              Issuer Action Code - Online (Tag '9F0F'), 默认gؓ?
 8              Issuer Action Code - Default(Tag '9F0D'), 默认gؓ?
 9        IAC-Denial指定TVR中哪些结果位?旉要离U拒l?br />10        IAC-Online指定TVR中哪些结果位?旉要在U授权?br />11        IAC-Default指定当要求在U授权但是终端没办法在线的情况下TVR中哪些结果位?旉要离U拒l。对?的结果位则离U授权。如果终端可以在U交易则IAC-Default不被执行?br />12        [IN] TAC(Terminal Action Codes)Q或者称作AAC(Acquirer Action Codes)Q和TVR完全一L数据l构Q包?
13              Terminal Action Code - Denial, 
14              Terminal Action Code - Online,
15              Terminal Action Code - Default
16        TAC和IAC完全一L意义Q在q行行ؓ决策的时候需要综合考虑IAC和TACQ只要其中某一个的相应位要求做出某U行为则需要执行该行ؓ。比如,当TVR中某位ؓ1时IAC要求DenialQ离U拒l)Q但是TAC没有要求DenialQ那么结果是需要离U拒l?br />17        [OUT] GENERATE AC Command
18处理Q?br />19        l端行ؓ决策Q就是根据TVRl果查找IAC和TAC表来军_向ICC发送GENERATE AC命o旉要请求AAC, ARQCq是TCQ即ȝ拒绝Q在U授权还是离U授权?br />20        向ICC发送GENERATE AC命o后,ICC本nq要做出行ؓ决策QCard Action AnalysisQ,以最l确定该交易是离U拒l?在线授权/ȝ授权?br />21        行ؓ决策的顺序是从IAC/TAC-Denial, IAC/TAC-Online到IAC/TAC-Default?br />22-----------------------------------------------------------------*/


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EMV交易q程解析之六 Terminal Risk Managementhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10256.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Thu, 20 Jul 2006 10:09:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10256.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/10256.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10256.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/10256.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/10256.htmlEMV交易q程解析之六 Terminal Risk Management
Michael 2006q??0?br />
 1/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 2名称QTerminalRiskManagement
 3参数Q?br /> 4        [IN] AIP(Application Interchange Profile)
 5        [IN] Terminal LOG
 6            用于获得本次交易帐号的最q一ơ交易金?br /> 7        [IN] TFL(Terminal Floor Limit - Tag '9F1B')
 8        [IN] TPURS(Target Percentage to be Used for Random Selection - l端数据)
 9        [IN] TVBRS(Threshold Value for Biased Random Selection - l端数据)
10        [IN] MTPUBRS(Maximum Target Percentage to be Used for Biased Random Selection - l端数据)
11        [IN] LCOL(Lower Consecutive Offline Limit - tag '9F14')
12        [IN] UCOL(Upper Consecutive Offline Limit - tag '9F23')
13        [IN] ATC(Application Transaction Counter - tag '9F36')
14        [IN] LOAR(Last Online ATC Register - tag '9F13')
15        [OUT] TVR(Terminal Verification Result)
16        [OUT] TSI(Transaction Status Information)
17处理Q?br />18        包括Q?br />19        [金额上限?Floor Limit checking)] 判断本次交易金额和上ơ交易金额的d是否过l端交易金额上限(Terminal Floor Limit)Q设|TVR相应位?br />20        [在线交易判断(Random Transaction Selection)] 对于交易金额于TVBRS的情况,l端需要生一?Q?9的随机数Q如果该随机数小于等于TPURS则该交易需要在UK证。对于金额大于等于TVBRS但小于TFL的交易,l端需要比较生的随机数和TTP(Transaction Target Percent)Q如果随机数于{于TTPQ则交易需要在UK证。其中,TTP=( (MTPUBRS-TPURS) * ((Amount,Authorised-TVBRS)/(TFL-TVBRS)) )+TPURS。若需要在UK证则讄TVR的相应位??br />21        [交易周期校验(Velocity Checking)] 发送GET DATA命odATC和Last Online ATC RegisterQ若dp|则校验结束ƈ|TVR相应位。若d成功则两值相减的l果同LCOL比较Q若l果大于LCOL则该交易需要在U授权。若l端当时无法在线交易则可以l离U交易的上限为UCOLQ当UCOLơ数辑ֈ时必进行在U授权,否则交易应当被拒l。若LOAR?则要讄TVR的“新卡”位??br />22        TRM执行完后|TVR和TSI相应位?br />23-----------------------------------------------------------------*/

24


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EMV交易q程解析之五 Cardholder Verificationhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10255.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Thu, 20 Jul 2006 10:05:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10255.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/10255.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/10255.html#Feedback4http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/10255.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/10255.htmlEMV交易q程解析之五 Cardholder Verification
Michael 2006q??0?br />
 1/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 2名称QCardholderVerification
 3参数Q?br /> 4        [IN] AIP(Application Interchange Profile)
 5        [IN] CVM List(Tag '8E')
 6              包括两个4-BYTE的AMOUNT FIELDs和数?-BYTE的CVRs(Cardholder Verification Rule)Q每个CVR包括两个字节Q分别是CVM(Cardholder Verification MethodQ表Cn份验证的可选方? Codes和CVM Condition Codes(表示q行w䆾验证的条??br /> 7        [OUT] TVR(Terminal Verification Result)
 8        [OUT] TSI(Transaction Status Information)
 9处理Q?br />10        l端判断CVR列表的第一个CVM Condition是否满Q如果满_采用对应的CVMq行验证。如果验证成功则CVq程l束Q否则需要检查该CVM Code的第7位,以决定是否需要读取第二个CVR元素l箋验证?br />11        如果W一个CVR的Condition不满I或者该条g不被l端理解Q则需要读取下一个CVRl箋验证?br />12        当其中只要有一个CVR验证成功Q则CV成功l束Q若所有验证都p|则CVp|。CVl果在TVR相应位中作设|?br />13        几个典型的CVMҎ(gu)有:Offline PIN, Online PIN, Signature, Combination CVMs.
14----------------------------------------------------------------*/


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EMV交易q程解析之四 Processing Restrictionshttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9858.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Fri, 14 Jul 2006 09:02:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9858.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/9858.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9858.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/9858.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/9858.htmlEMV交易q程解析之四 Processing Restrictions
Michael 2006q??4?/strong>

 1 /* ----------------------------------------------------------------
 2 名称QProcessingRestrictions
 3 参数Q?br />  4         [IN] TERMINAL和ICC上的AVN(Application Version Number)
 5         [IN] AUC(Application Usage Control)
 6         [IN] Issuer Country Code
 7         [IN] Terminal Country Code
 8         [IN] Application Effective Date
 9         [IN] Application Expiration Date
10         [OUT] TVR
11 处理Q?br /> 12         包括Q?br /> 13         [应用版本判断] 比较TERMINAL和ICC的AVNQ设|TVR相应位?br /> 14         [ICC地域判断] Ҏ(gu)交易cdQ比较Issuer Country Code和Terminal Country 
15
16 CodeQ依据比较结果和AUC的相应位匚w与否Q设|TVR相应位?br /> 17         [有效期判断] 判断当前交易日期是否在有效期内,讄TVR相应位?br /> 18
19 ---------------------------------------------------------------- */


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EMV交易q程解析之三 Offline Data Authenticationhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9856.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Fri, 14 Jul 2006 08:57:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9856.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/9856.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9856.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/9856.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/9856.htmlEMV交易q程解析之三 Offline Data Authentication
Michael 2006q??4?br />
 1
 2/*----------------------------------------------------------------
 3名称QOfflineDataAuthentication(ODA)
 4参数Q?br /> 5        [IN] AIP(Application Interchange Profile)
 6        [IN] AFL(Application File Locator)
 7        [IN] AFL中指定的记录数据
 8        [IN] SDA Tag List(tag '9F4A')
 9        [OUT] TVR(Terminal Verification Results)
10       [OUT] TSI(Transaction Status Information)
11处理Q?br />12        l端从AIP数据判断执行哪种cd的ODA?br />13        如果ICC和TERMINAL都支持CDDA/ACG(Combined Dynamic Data Authentication/Application Cryptogram Generation)Q则l端需要执行CDDA/ACG?br />14        如果l端不执行CDDA/ACGQ此Ӟ若ICC和TERMINAL都支持OFFLINE DDAQ则l端执行OFFLINE DDA?br />15        如果l端不执行OFFLINE DDAQ此Ӟ若ICC和TERMINAL都只持OFFLINE SDAQ则l端执行OFFLINE SDA?br />16        如果以上三种ODA都不执行则设|TVR的“ODA未执行”标志ؓ1?br />17
18----------------------------------------------------------------*/


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EMV交易q程解析之二 Read Application Datahttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9545.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Fri, 07 Jul 2006 07:39:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9545.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/9545.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9545.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/9545.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/9545.html EMV交易q程解析之二 Read Application Data
Michael 2006q???br />
q个q程用来遍历ICC中的文g/记录/TLV对象Qƈ保存在终端上?br />


]]>EMV交易q程解析之一 Initiate Applicationhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9540.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Fri, 07 Jul 2006 06:28:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9540.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/9540.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9540.html#Feedback6http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/9540.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/9540.htmlEMV交易q程解析之一 Initiate Application
Michael 2006q???br />
EMV标准定义了十一个过E,q些q程主要通过交易数据的认证、持卡hw䆾验证以及风险理{来实现交易的安全,接下来我们将对这些过E逐一q行剖析Q从而明白,Z么EMV交易是安全的?br />我将把每个过E喻作一个函敎ͼ采用函数的语法进行解析?br />
初始化应用(Initiate ApplicationQ是持卡行应用选择后的W一个过E?br />



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什么是AC(Application Cryptogram)http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9507.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Thu, 06 Jul 2006 13:05:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9507.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/9507.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9507.html#Feedback2http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/9507.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/9507.html 什么是AC(Application Cryptogram)?
Michael 2006q???br />
我们从前面了解到Q目前终端和ICC之间?3个命令交互,其中有一个很关键的命令叫GENERATE ACQ那么,什么是ACQ它又是用来做什么的Q?br />单地_AC是一?strong>ICC产生的交易代?/strong>QGENERATE AC是一?strong>ICC做交易决{?/strong>的过E。也是_l端执行每次交易Ӟ都要发送该命olICCq行交易决策Q比如拒l交易还是要求联机授权)Q来军_该笔交易接受与否以及如何接受?br />l端在发送GENERATE AC之前Q自己首先有?strong>l端行ؓ分析的过E,分析的结果是军_需要向ICC发送什么样的AChQ联机授权(ONLINEQ、脱机拒l(REJECT OFFLINEQ还是脱机授?APPROVE OFFLINE)。ICC在接收命令ƈ处理后返回其决策l果即AC倹{?br />针对l端的不同请求,相应圎ͼAC有以下几U类型:
cd                                                                                                   意义
Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC)                  拒绝交易
Application Authorisation Referral(AAR)                             Referral requested by the card
Authorisation Request Cryptogram(ARQC)                          要求联机授权
Transaction Certificate(TC)                                                      接受交易

值得注意的是Q终端发送GENERATE AC命o的数据ƈ不是TLV~码的,而是׃个叫做CDOL的数据对象来军_的。CDOLQ指Card Risk Management Data Object ListQ它指定了GENERATE AC的命令数据需要包括哪些对象。ICC中需要有两个CDOL对象QCDOL1(TAG-'8C')和CDOL2(TAG-'8D')分别用于两次命o的发送,在一ơ交易中最多只能发送两ơGENERATE AC 命oQ超q?ơ则会执行失败导致交易终止?br />GENERATE AC命o的数据可能还会包含一个叫做TC Hash Value的数据,q个值通过TDOL(Transaction Certificate Data Object List)l过HASH法计算得到。如果ICC中没有TDOLQ终端可能需要保存一个默认的TDOLQ以计算TC HASH VALUE.

前面提到GENERATE AC的决{结果是ACQ有四种cdQ,那么我们看看其具体的数据l构是如何的?br />      值                                                                 是否必返?/strong>
Cryptogram Information Data                          ?br />Application Transaction Counter (ATC)       ?br />Application Cryptogram (AC)                         ?br />Issuer Application Data                                    可选     ?br />其中CID(Cryptogram Information Data)中指明了决策l果属于哪种ACcd?br />
GENERATE AC是卡行ؓ分析的重要过E,如果ICCq回TCQ则交易成功Q如果返回AAC则交易失败,q回其他时则l端会发送第二次GENERATE AC命oQ以军_交易授权l果?br />
[完]



]]>
ICC的数据编?/title><link>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9169.html</link><dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/dc:creator><author>奔跑的阿?/author><pubDate>Thu, 29 Jun 2006 10:06:00 GMT</pubDate><guid>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9169.html</guid><wfw:comment>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/9169.html</wfw:comment><comments>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9169.html#Feedback</comments><slash:comments>0</slash:comments><wfw:commentRss>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/9169.html</wfw:commentRss><trackback:ping>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/9169.html</trackback:ping><description><![CDATA[ <p> <font style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffffff" size="2"> <font size="3">ICC的数据编?br /></font>Michael 2006/6/29<br /><br />q里我们讨论ICC和读卡器l端之间交互数据的编码格式?br />BER-TLV(Basic Encoding Rule - Tag Length Value)~码Q这个是ISO/IEC 8825定义的标准,在EMV规范中,TAG包含1Q?个字节,LENGTH包含1Q?个字节,VALUE为数据元素(对于原始数据对象Q或者模板(对于l合数据对象Q?br />在某些情况下Qؓ了简化ICC内部的处理,ICC要求l端发送给它的数据按照ICC定义的格式编码,而非TLV格式。这U格式要求终端简单地把ICC定义了的数据元素q接一块,l装成一个域Q再发送给ICC。那么去哪里得到ICC定义的编码格式呢QICC中定义了数据对象列表QDOL,DATA OBJECT LISTQ,l端通过发送相兛_令给ICCQ即可获得DOL定义Q那么终端就知道了该把哪些数据元素组装v来?br /><br /></font> </p> <img src ="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/aggbug/9169.html" width = "1" height = "1" /><br><br><div align=right><a style="text-decoration:none;" href="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/" target="_blank">奔跑的阿?/a> 2006-06-29 18:06 <a href="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9169.html#Feedback" target="_blank" style="text-decoration:none;">发表评论</a></div>]]></description></item><item><title>ICC的数据存?/title><link>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9156.html</link><dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/dc:creator><author>奔跑的阿?/author><pubDate>Thu, 29 Jun 2006 08:49:00 GMT</pubDate><guid>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9156.html</guid><wfw:comment>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/9156.html</wfw:comment><comments>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9156.html#Feedback</comments><slash:comments>0</slash:comments><wfw:commentRss>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/9156.html</wfw:commentRss><trackback:ping>http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/9156.html</trackback:ping><description><![CDATA[ <p> <font size="2"> <font size="3">ICC的数据存?br /></font>Michael 2006/06/29<br /><br />ICC卡支持多应用Q每个应用都存储着相关的信息,q些信息像操作系l的文gl构一样存储?br />最的信息单位?strong>数据元素</strong>Q它包含数据元素名称、内Ҏ(gu)q、格式和~码Q比如:<br /><strong>Name          |          Description               |   Source  |       Format          |Template | Tag   |    Length</strong><br />Application | Valid cardholder account number | ICC | cn var. up to 19 |  '70' or '77' | '5A' | var. up to 10<br />Primary Account<br />Number (PAN)<br /><br /><strong>数据对象</strong>Q由TAG、LENGTH、VALUEl成Q每个数据对象由一个该应用范围内唯一的TAGq行标识。和OS的文件夹cMQ一个数据对象可仅仅包含数据元素Q或者子数据对象Q如果该数据对象gؓ数据元素Q则被称作?strong>原始数据对象</strong>(Primitive Data Object)”;如果该数据对象gؓ其他Q一个或多个Q数据对象,则它被称作?strong>l合数据对象</strong>(Constructed Data Object)”,相应圎ͼ它的DUC?strong>模板</strong>(Template)”。这两类数据对象的TAG是不一LQ所以,从TAG可以知道它属于哪一U类型。例如,77099F1A0208409F350101Q它是一个组合对象,TAG='77'Q组合对象的长度?个字节,l合对象的gؓ"9F1A0208409F350101"Q即它包含两个原始数据对象,分别是对?9F1A"(LEN=02, VALUE=0840)?9F35"(LEN=01, VALUE=01)?br /><br />上面我们讨论了一些逻辑概念Q现在让我们具体看看ICC中对上述概念是如何存储的?br /><br />每个应用包含一个或多个<strong>文g</strong>(Files)Q它是ICC中信息的存储格式Q文件中包含大量?strong>记录</strong>(Records)Q记录就是模板(卛_存放了一个或多个数据对象Q。关于他们之间的关系Q我们可以做个Ş象的比喻Q?em>文g</em>像数据库系l中的数据库Q?em>记录</em>如同数据库中的表Q?em>数据对象</em>则似表中的每条记录?br /><br />那么如何讉K文g呢?<br />文g有三U类型:AEF(Application Elementary File)、ADF(Application Definition File)、DDF(Directory Definition File)。对于ADF和DDFQ采用文件名U进行访问,文g不可以重名,它在<strong>?/strong>中必L独一无二的。对于AEFQ采用一个整数标识(范围?Q?0Q即SFI(Short File Identifier)q行讉KQ同样地Q该标识不可以重复,它在<strong>同一应用</strong>中是独一无二的?/font> </p> <p> <font size="2">我们再来看看l端通过哪些命o来和ICC交互?br />不同的发卡行对IC卡的定义是不一LQ在EMV标准中,定义了以下命令集Q除此之外,发卡行可以定义针对自w的命o集?br />l端发给ICC的命令集合(?3个)Q?br />命ocd   指o?  含义<br />?x?        ?E?    APPLICATION BLOCK<br />?x?        ?8?    APPLICATION UNBLOCK<br />?x?        ?6?    CARD BLOCK<br />?x?        ?2?    EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE【请求ICC校验ISSUER AUTHENTICATION DATA?br />?x?        ‘AE?    GENERATE APPLICATION CRYPTOGRAM【返回CID(Cryptogram Information Data), ATC<br />                                     (Application  Transaction Counter, AC(Application Cryptogram)数据?br />?x?        ?4’ ?  GET CHALLENGE【获取随机数?br />?x?        ‘CA?    GET DATA【限于读取ATC(tag '9F36'), Last Online ATC Register(tag '9F13'), PIN Try<br />                                     Counter(tag '9F17')?br />?x?        ‘A8’ ?  GET PROCESSING OPTIONS【返回AIP(Application Interchange ProfileQ和AFL<br />                                    (Application File Locator)?br />?x?        ?8’ ?  INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE【请求ICC计算q返回Signed Dynamic Application Data?br />?x?        ?4’ ?  PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PIN)CHANGE/UNBLOCK【激zPINQ?br />                                    重设PIN RETRY Counter?br />?x?        ‘B2’ ?  READ RECORD【读取RECORD数据Q如Application Expiration Date, Application PAN, <br />                           Card Risk Managemt Data Object List1, Card Risk Management Data Object List2, etc?br />?x?        ‘A4’ ?  SELECT<br />?x?        ?0’ ?  VERIFY【要求ICCq行脱机密码校验QTransaction PIN & Reference PINQ?br />?x?        ‘Dx’ ?  RFU for the payment systems<br />?x?        ‘Ex’ ?  RFU for the payment systems<br />?x?        ‘xx’ ?  RFU for manufacturers for proprietary INS coding<br />‘Ex?        ‘xx’ ?  RFU for issuers for proprietary INS coding</font> </p> <p> <font size="2">l端发给ICC的命令由4个字节的命o包头和命令码以及相关参数l成。ICCq回l终端的数据是我们在前面提到?b>数据对象</b>?b>模板Q?/b>再添?个字节的命o执行状态?/font> </p> <p> <font size="2">到这里,我们知道了ICC中有哪些数据Q以及它们如何存储,l端如何讉K它们?br /></font> </p> <img src ="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/aggbug/9156.html" width = "1" height = "1" /><br><br><div align=right><a style="text-decoration:none;" href="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/" target="_blank">奔跑的阿?/a> 2006-06-29 16:49 <a href="http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/9156.html#Feedback" target="_blank" style="text-decoration:none;">发表评论</a></div>]]></description></item><item><title>如何实现EMV卡的?sh)子商务pȝhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/8235.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Wed, 07 Jun 2006 02:37:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/8235.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/8235.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/8235.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/8235.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/8235.html 如何实现EMV卡的?sh)子商?E-Commerce)pȝ
Michael 2006/05/20

一 pȝ架构
IC?lt;-->CS(Cardholder System)<-->MS(Merchant Server)<-->PG(Payment Gateway)?br />Cardholder System和Merchant Server之间采用SET(Secure Electronic Transaction)message protocol?/font>

?持卡人系l(Cardholder SystemQ的设计
在电(sh)子商务系l的持卡人系l中Q需要考虑以下因素Q?/font>


1。CS需要实现的IC卡交互功?br />包括QCard Selection, Application Selection, Application Initiation, Read Application Data, Cardholder Verification, Terminal Action Analysis, Issuer Script Processing&CompletionQ不需要实C下功能:Offline Data Authentication, Processing Restrictions, Terminal Risk Management.

2。CS需要支持的IC卡命令集
包括QSELECT, GET PROCESSING OPTIONS, READ RECORD, GET DATA, VERIFY, GENERATE AC, EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE。同ӞCS需要能够解释IC卡返回的数据?/font>

3。CS需要保存和处理的数?br />在交易过E中QCS需要保存有以下数据元素Q?br />1) Amount Other: Cashback amount, 在E-Commercepȝ中gؓI?br />2) BrandID-AID Table:
3) ISO8859 Code Table: 帮助解析Application Preferred Name{数据?br />4) Terminal Type: E-Commercepȝ的终端类型是“unattended, online, controlled by cardholder?value=34).
5) Transaction Type: E-Commercepȝ执行的交易是"purchase of goods or service"(value=00).
6) Terminal Verification Results: CS执行完每个功能保存的l果Q共5 BYTESQ?0BITSQ?br />4。SET协议扩展消息
SET消息包中需要包含以下信息以执行EMV交易?br />1) commonChip: the cryptogram and related dataQ由CS生成Q存攑֜PReq消息中?br />2) acqCardExtensions: Issuer Authentication and Issuer Script dataQ由Payment Gateway生成Q存攑֜PRes消息的AcqCardMsgData域中?br />3) onlinePIN: PIN data entered by the cardholderQ由CS生成Q存攑֜PReq消息中?/font>

?Merchant Server的设?br />无特D需求?/font>

?PG(Payment Gateway)的设?br />PG需要能够处理上q定义的SET协议扩展消息?/font>

?交易处理q程
定义IC?lt;-->CS(Cardholder System)<-->MS(Merchant Server)<-->PG(Payment Gateway)之间的交互接口?br />1。交易流E总览
如图?br />2。CS和IC卡的功能交互接口
1) Card Selection: 持卡人选择相应的支付卡执行交易
q程Q?br />Merchant Server支持的所有支付卡需要被昄Q?br />CS需要提供所有可支付的方式;
CS需提示持卡人在交易期间IC卡不能退出,除非提示q么?/font>

2) Application Selection: CS从IC卡中选择相应应用q显C?br />q程Q?br />CS从MS发送的SET Initiation Message中获取可用于交易支付的机构BrandQƈ使用BrandID-AID表找到ƈ创徏支持的应用标?AIDs)。如果AID没有扑ֈQ则要求持卡人尝试另一张卡或者更新BrandID-AID表?br />在IC卡给SELECT命o的答复中若包含Application Preferred NameQ则该名U需要显C给持卡人,若不包含Q则昄Application Labell持卡h。如果答复中q包含Issuer URLQ则CS同时q需要显CIssuer的LOGOl用戗?/font>

3) Application Initiation: 初始化应?/font>

4) Read Application Data: CSdIC卡应用数?/font>

5) Cardholder Verification: CS从持卡h处获取PIN信息发给IC卡或者ISSUER做n份校?br />当AIPW一字节的第五位?Ӟ需要做持卡n份验证?/font>

6) Terminal Action Analysis: IC卡针对CS的交易授权请求决定DECLINE OFFLINEq是同意ONLINE AUTHORISATION REQUEST
要求Q在lIC卡的GENERATE AC命o中发送的数据元素需要按照一定的格式转换Q以方便IC卡理解?/font>

7) Issuer Script Processing and Completion: CSҎ(gu)脚本执行操作q提C用户取?/font>

3。CS和MS的消息交互接?br />1) SET Initiation: MS通知CSq告知支付卡方式{交易细?br />MS需要创建SET Payment Initiation消息q发送给CSQCS需要能够解析处理该消息?br />2) Purchase Initiation: CS创徏Purchasehq证MS和PG的n份,同时发送交易信息给MS
q程QCS创徏发送PInitReq消息Q包含Language, BrandID, BIN数据Q,MS创徏响应PInitRes消息
3) Purchase Request&Response
PReq包含Language, BrandID, PAN, BIN, AID, Application Expiration Date{数据?/font>

4。MS和PG的消息交互接?br />1) Authorization Request(AuthReq) & Response(AuthRes)
2) Capture Request(CapReq) & Response(CapRes)



]]>
DDA q程解析http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6609.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Wed, 03 May 2006 15:22:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6609.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/6609.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6609.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/6609.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/6609.htmlDDA(Dynamic data authentication) is performed by the terminal using a digital signature
scheme based on public key techniques to authenticate the ICC, and confirm the
legitimacy of critical ICC-resident/generated data and data received from the
terminal. This precludes the counterfeiting of any such card.

DDA的思\是把每个CERTIFICATE作ؓ输入通过指定的算法进行还?RECOVER)Q对q原
后的l果数据q行逐项地校验,若有M一不满则DDAp|Q当且仅当所有的目都通过
后DDA才成功?br />
一 ICC必须包含的数?/strong>
a) Certification Authority Public Key Index
b) Issuer Public Key Certificate
c) ICC Public Key Certificate
d) Issuer Public Key Remainder
e) Issuer Public Key Exponent
f)  ICC Public Key Remainder
g) ICC Public Key Exponent
h) ICC Private Key : An ICC internal variable-length data element used to
generate the Signed Dynamic Application Data.
i)  Signed Dynamic Application Data: A variable-length data element generated by
the ICC using the private key that corresponds to the public key authenticated
in the ICC Public Key Certificate. It is a digital signature covering critical ICCresident/
generated and terminal data elements,

?Terminal应保存数据:
a) Six CA public keys per RID(Registered Application Provider Identifier)
b) Key-related information for each CA public key
c) Corresponding algorithm

?DDA的执行过E按ơ序分ؓ四个步骤QQ何一个步骤若出现异常则DDAp|Q只有所?br />步骤都完成后DDA才成功:

a) Retrieval of the Certification Authority Public Key
The terminal reads the Certification Authority Public Key Index. Using this index
and the RID, the terminal can identify and retrieve the terminal-stored
Certification Authority Public Key Modulus and Exponent and the associated keyrelated
information, and the corresponding algorithm to be used. If the terminal
does not have the key stored associated with this index and RID, dynamic data
authentication has failed
.

b) Retrieval of the Issuer Public Key
1. If the Issuer Public Key Certificate has a length different from the length of the
Certification Authority Public Key Modulus obtained in the previous section,
dynamic data authentication has failed.
2. In order to obtain the recovered data specified in Table 9, apply the recovery
function specified in Annex A2.1 on the Issuer Public Key Certificate using the
Certification Authority Public Key in conjunction with the corresponding
algorithm. If the Recovered Data Trailer is not equal to ‘BC? dynamic data
authentication has failed
.
3. Check the Recovered Data Header. If it is not ?A? dynamic data authentication
has failed
.
4. Check the Certificate Format. If it is not ?2? dynamic data authentication has
failed
.
5. Concatenate from left to right the second to the tenth data elements in Table 9
(that is, Certificate Format through Issuer Public Key or Leftmost Digits of the
Issuer Public Key), followed by the Issuer Public Key Remainder (if present) and
finally the Issuer Public Key Exponent.
6. Apply the indicated hash algorithm (derived from the Hash Algorithm Indicator)
to the result of the concatenation of the previous step to produce the hash result.
7. Compare the calculated hash result from the previous step with the recovered
Hash Result. If they are not the same, dynamic data authentication has failed.
8. Verify that the Issuer Identification Number matches the leftmost 3-8 PAN digits
(allowing for the possible padding of the Issuer Identification Number with
hexadecimal ‘F’s). If not, dynamic data authentication has failed.
9. Verify that the last day of the month specified in the Certificate Expiration Date
is equal to or later than today's date. If the Certificate Expiration Date is earlier
than today's date, the certificate has expired, in which case dynamic data
authentication has failed.

10.Verify that the concatenation of RID, Certification Public Key Index, and
Certificate Serial Number is valid. If not, dynamic data authentication has
failed
.
11.If the Issuer Public Key Algorithm Indicator is not recognised, dynamic data
authentication has failed
.
12.If all the checks above are correct, concatenate the Leftmost Digits of the Issuer
Public Key and the Issuer Public Key Remainder (if present) to obtain the Issuer
Public Key Modulus, and continue with the next steps for the retrieval of the ICC
Public Key.

c) Retrieval of the ICC Public Key
1. If the ICC Public Key Certificate has a length different from the length of the
Issuer Public Key Modulus obtained in the previous section, dynamic data
authentication has failed
.
2. In order to obtain the recovered data specified in Table 10, apply the recovery
function specified in Annex A2.1 on the ICC Public Key Certificate using the
Issuer Public Key in conjunction with the corresponding algorithm. If the
Recovered Data Trailer is not equal to ‘BC? dynamic data authentication has
failed
.
3. Check the Recovered Data Header. If it is not ?A? dynamic data authentication
has failed.

4. Check the Certificate Format. If it is not ?4? dynamic data authentication has
failed
.
5. Concatenate from left to right the second to the tenth data elements in Table 10
(that is, Certificate Format through ICC Public Key or Leftmost Digits of the ICC
Public Key), followed by the ICC Public Key Remainder (if present), the ICC
Public Key Exponent and finally the static data to be authenticated specified in
Part II of Book 3 of these specifications. If the Static Data Authentication Tag
List is present and contains tags other than ?2? then dynamic data
authentication has failed
.
6. Apply the indicated hash algorithm (derived from the Hash Algorithm Indicator)
to the result of the concatenation of the previous step to produce the hash result.
7. Compare the calculated hash result from the previous step with the recovered
Hash Result. If they are not the same, dynamic data authentication has failed.
8. Check if the recovered PAN is equal to the Application PAN, read from the ICC.
If not, dynamic data authentication has failed.
9. Verify that the last day of the month specified in the Certificate Expiration Date
is equal to or later than today's date. If not, dynamic data authentication has
failed
.
10.If the ICC Public Key Algorithm Indicator is not recognised, dynamic data
authentication has failed
.
11.If all the checks above are correct, concatenate the Leftmost Digits of the ICC
Public Key and the ICC Public Key Remainder (if present) to obtain the ICC
Public Key Modulus, and continue with the actual dynamic data authentication
described in the two sections below.
d) Dynamic Data Authentication
分ؓSTANDARD和COMBINED两种方式?br />d.1 Standard Dynamic Data Authentication
d.1.1. Dynamic Signature Generation

Terminal向ICC发送一个INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE命oq带DDOL中定义的数据Q?br />UCؓTerminal Dynamic DataQ?br />ICC对Terminal Dynamic Data重新l合及格式化处理后生?em>Dynamic Application Data?br />ICC对Dynamic Application Data用自qU钥和相应算法进行签名,最l生?br />Signed Dynamic Application Data.

d.1.2. Dynamic Signature Verification
接下来的q程和SDAcM?br />1. If the Signed Dynamic Application Data has a length different from the length of
the ICC Public Key Modulus, dynamic data authentication has failed.
2. To obtain the recovered data specified in Table 13, apply the recovery function
specified in Annex A2.1 on the Signed Dynamic Application Data using the ICC
Public Key in conjunction with the corresponding algorithm. If the Recovered
Data Trailer is not equal to ‘BC? dynamic data authentication has failed.
3. Check the Recovered Data Header. If it is not ?A? dynamic data authentication
has failed.

4. Check the Signed Data Format. If it is not ?5? dynamic data authentication has
failed
.
5. Concatenate from left to right the second to the sixth data elements in Table 13
(that is, Signed Data Format through Pad Pattern), followed by the data
elements specified by the DDOL.
6. Apply the indicated hash algorithm (derived from the Hash Algorithm Indicator)
to the result of the concatenation of the previous step to produce the hash result.
7. Compare the calculated hash result from the previous step with the recovered
Hash Result. If they are not the same, dynamic data authentication has failed.

If all the above steps were executed successfully, dynamic data authentication was
successful
. The ICC Dynamic Number contained in the ICC Dynamic Data
recovered in Table 13 shall be stored in Tag ?F4C?
d.2 Combined Dynamic Data Authentication/Application Cryptogram Generation
和d.1一样需要Signature creation和verification两步Q不同的是在creation中,d.2需?br />Cryptogram Information Data object参与l成 ICC Dynamic DataQ进而格式化成相?br />的Dynamic Application DataQ然后用其私钥和法q行{֐QŞ成Signed Dynamic
Application Data.
Verificationq程同d.1cM?br />


]]>SDA q程解析http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6594.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Wed, 03 May 2006 09:15:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6594.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/6594.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6594.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/6594.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/6594.html SDA(Static data authentication) is performed by the terminal using a digital signature
scheme based on public key techniques to confirm the legitimacy of critical ICCresident
static data identified by the AFL and by the optional Static Data Authentication Tag List.
This detects unauthorised alteration of data after personalisation.

一 ICC应保存数据:
a) CA Public Key Index
b)Issuer Public Key Certificate
c) Signed Static Application Data

?Terminal应保存数据:
a) Six CA public keys per RID(Registered Application Provider Identifier)
b) Key-related information for each CA public key
c) Corresponding algorithm

?SDAq程按次序分三个步骤Q其中Q一步骤若出现异常则SDAp|Q只有三个步骤顺利完?br />后SDA才成功:

a) Retrieval of the Certification Authority Public Key
The terminal reads the Certification Authority Public Key Index. Using this index
and the RID, the terminal shall identify and retrieve the terminal-stored
Certification Authority Public Key Modulus and Exponent and the associated keyrelated
information, and the corresponding algorithm to be used. If the terminal does not have the
key stored associated with this index and RID, static data authentication has failed.

b) Retrieval of the Issuer Public Key
1. If the Issuer Public Key Certificate has a length different from the length of the
Certification Authority Public Key Modulus obtained in the previous section,
static data authentication has failed.
2. In order to obtain the recovered data specified in Table 4, apply the recovery
function specified in Annex A2.1 to the Issuer Public Key Certificate using the
Certification Authority Public Key in conjunction with the corresponding
algorithm. If the Recovered Data Trailer is not equal to ‘BC? static data
authentication has failed.
3. Check the Recovered Data Header. If it is not ?A? static data authentication has
failed.
4. Check the Certificate Format. If it is not ?2? static data authentication has
failed.
5. Concatenate from left to right the second to the tenth data elements in Table 4
(that is, Certificate Format through Issuer Public Key or Leftmost Digits of the
Issuer Public Key), followed by the Issuer Public Key Remainder (if present) and
finally the Issuer Public Key Exponent.
6. Apply the indicated hash algorithm (derived from the Hash Algorithm Indicator)
to the result of the concatenation of the previous step to produce the hash result.
7. Compare the calculated hash result from the previous step with the recovered
Hash Result. If they are not the same, static data authentication has failed.
8. Verify that the Issuer Identification Number matches the leftmost 3-8 PAN digits
(allowing for the possible padding of the Issuer Identification Number with
hexadecimal ‘F’s). If not, static data authentication has failed.
9. Verify that the last day of the month specified in the Certificate Expiration Date
is equal to or later than today's date. If the Certificate Expiration Date is earlier
than today's date, the certificate has expired, in which case static data
authentication has failed.
10. Verify that the concatenation of RID, Certification Authority Public Key Index,
and Certificate Serial Number is valid. If not, static data authentication has
failed4.
11. If the Issuer Public Key Algorithm Indicator is not recognised, static data
authentication has failed.
12. If all the checks above are correct, concatenate the Leftmost Digits of the Issuer
Public Key and the Issuer Public Key Remainder (if present) to obtain the Issuer
Public Key Modulus, and continue with the next steps for the verification of the
Signed Static Application Data.

c) Verification of the Signed Static Application Data
1. If the Signed Static Application Data has a length different from the length of the
Issuer Public Key Modulus, static data authentication has failed.
2. In order to obtain the Recovered Data specified in Table 5, apply the recovery
function specified in Annex A2.1 on the Signed Static Application Data using the
Issuer Public Key in conjunction with the corresponding algorithm. If the
Recovered Data Trailer is not equal to ‘BC? static data authentication has failed.
3. Check the Recovered Data Header. If it is not ?A? static data authentication has
failed.
4. Check the Signed Data Format. If it is not ?3? static data authentication has
failed.
5. Concatenate from left to right the second to the fifth data elements in Table 5
(that is, Signed Data Format through Pad Pattern), followed by the static data to
be authenticated as specified in Part II of Book 3 of these specifications. If the
Static Data Authentication Tag List is present and contains tags other than ?2?
then static data authentication has failed.
6. Apply the indicated hash algorithm (derived from the Hash Algorithm Indicator)
to the result of the concatenation of the previous step to produce the hash result.
7. Compare the calculated hash result from the previous step with the recovered
Hash Result. If they are not the same, static data authentication has failed.
If all of the above steps were executed successfully, static data authentication was
successful. The Data Authentication Code recovered in Table 5 shall be stored in
Tag ?F45?

参考:<<EMV2000 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment Systems Book 2
 - Security and Key Management>>


]]>Digital Signaturehttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6592.html奔跑的阿?/dc:creator>奔跑的阿?/author>Wed, 03 May 2006 06:32:00 GMThttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6592.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/6592.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/articles/6592.html#Feedback0http://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/comments/commentRss/6592.htmlhttp://www.shnenglu.com/MichaelLiu/services/trackbacks/6592.html 数字{֐的原?/b>

1 被发送文仉用哈希算法对?始报文进行运,得到一个固定长度的数字ԌUCؓ报文摘要 (Message Digest)Q不同的报文所得到的报文摘要各异,但对?同的报文它的报文摘要却是唯一的?br />2 发送方生成报文的报文摘要,用自qU钥Ҏ(gu) 要进行加密来形成发送方的数字签名?br />3 q个数字{֐作为报文的附g和报文一起发送给接收斏V?br />4 接收斚w先从接收到的原始报文中用同样的算法计出新的报文摘要Q?再用发送方的公钥对报文附g的数字签名进行解密,比较两个报文 摘要Q如果值相同,接收方就能确认该数字{֐是发送方的?br />



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